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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, 
Auditing and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
 
Prior studies show the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) for the 
society and provide steps that have been taken to disclose such information, while there 
is a paucity in the literature regarding the audit implications. This study examines the 
impact of CSR on the determination of the Audit Fees, using a large sample of publicly 
traded European firms for the period 2012-2016. We find a strong positive association 
between CSR and Audit Fees, meaning that highly rated companies for CSR activities 
pay more audit fees. But this association becomes negative for companies which are 
located in countries where there is a well-structured framework for sustainability 
reporting. We interpret this finding as suggesting that auditing for environmental, social 
and governance issues is a complex procedure that requires increased audit effort, taking 
into consideration that the reports will be longer and despite the financial assurance, an 
auditor has to provide sustainability assurance as well. Also, the recently introduced 
concept of CSR and the absence of a common legal framework for CSR disclosure, even 
among European countries, make the audit role more demanding. Taken together, our 
research linked CSR with Audit Fees and suggest that establishing firms’ nonfinancial 
disclosures may lead to harmonization of accounting policies, enhancing the 
transparency. Last but not least, the need for awareness and further accounting education 
on CSR policies should be highlighted, as a measure to eliminate economic scandals and 
restrict Audit Fees. 
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Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), is an upcoming trend in the corporate world 
with a critical role in the maintenance of business survival and profitability. Is an extremely 
developing concept that takes into consideration social, environmental, human rights issues and 
the elimination of worldwide social problems like poverty (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006). 
Moreover, CSR has become an issue of paramount importance since investors, regulators and 
customers are insisting on more transparency from firms. Additionally, Public tend to be more 
aware of social and environmental effects of firm’s actions and companies try to gain the 
approval of third parties and shareholders because their continued support is crucial for the 
perceived credibility. Thus, companies have begun to recognize their social and environmental 
responsibilities and managed them in the same manner as their economic responsibilities, in the 
way to gain stakeholder’s acceptance. 
 
Central to the entire discipline of CSR is the concept of environmental reporting and 
sustainability assurance. CSR has been studied by many researchers highlighting the 
importance of acquaintance with that issues.  From a corporate aspect, despite the financial 
goals that must achieve, companies should fulfill other non-financial perspectives such as social 
and environmental issues to ensure that their economic activity is ecological and socially 
sustainable (Bebbington et al. 2014). As a result, the use of CSR activities has become a 
constituent part of business culture and explicit CSR policies have been adopted even by small 
companies (Cheney, 2010).  
 
However, there is need to address CSR based on accounting. Recent trends in CSR have 
led to a proliferation of studies in regard to  CSR disclosures, metrics and legislation. Hence, 
sustainability accounting has been developing, because it is important to evaluate social 
responsibility through the scope of accounting. In addition, social and environmental 
accounting has changed through the years and more specific reporting have altered from 
environmental accounting to sustainability reporting and then to integrated reporting. In more 
detail, with integrated reporting, there is an effort to report a concise integrated picture of a 
company’s social, environmental, economic and governance performance and their effects. 
These reports are different from sustainability reports, due to the fact that integrated reports are 
guided by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that offers a sustainability reporting framework 
and currently is the most widely used around the world.  
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To measure the quality and the accuracy of the CSR reporting, auditing has a prevailing 
role in providing sustainability assurance. As a tool to accumulate corporate transparency, 
auditing is a very significant procedure for investors and regulators. Generally, auditors are 
described as independent gatekeepers who act on behalf of investors and protect their interests. 
Auditors have a responsibility to gather evidence and obtain reasonable assurance about 
whether financial statements are free of error and fraud.1 What is to say, these guardians audit 
the internal control process, assert presentation and disclosure of financial statements.  
 
Consequently, auditing has become a more complex procedure since sustainability 
assurance increase the auditors’ duties. On the other hand, auditing procedure is easier when 
managers are known, to be honest and ethical, but the question is how to certificate solvency 
and measure audit risks and efforts. The observed audit price, or otherwise the audit fees, 
defined by the firm risk and future changes in a company’s economic performance (Stanley, 
2011; Malhotra et. al. 2015). Also, a number of cross-sectional studies suggest an association 
between Audit Fees and client’s business risk, client’s size, operation complexity and audit 
hours (Hay et al. 2006; De Fond and Zhang 2014; Bell et al. 2001; Stanley, 2011).  
 
Lack of regulation has existed for many years and so there is not a common framework 
to conform the accounting policies regarding CSR and thus, the audit role became harder. So, , 
CSR policies contribute to a stronger business performance that reduces risks, but on the other 
hand, the audit effort is dramatically increased booming the audit price as well.  
 
To date, no previous study has examined the relationship between CSR performance 
and audit fees determination in European countries. For the beneficial effects of CSR adoption, 
no one disagrees. But, there is no clear evidence in the above relationship, since the response 
of CSR to Audit fees is not fully understood.  
 
In this study, first, we are going to analyze how the commitment to CSR activities and 
the levels of CSR performance, impact on audit fees. The questions that raised are how auditors 
                                                          
1  Statements on Auditing standards (SAS) issued by AICPA , Section 110, Responsibilities and Functions of the 
Independent Auditor, paragraph .02, states: "The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, whether 
caused by error or fraud." This section establishes standards and provides guidance to auditors in fulfilling that 
responsibility, as it relates to fraud, in an audit of financial statements conducted in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) 
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respond to CSR information disclosure and how they evaluate CSR policies. We tried to clarify 
how socially responsible activities affect audit fees since CSR becoming more and more 
essential. Second, we investigate whether and to what extent too heavy sustainability disclosure 
regulations have an impact on audit fees. Thus we proceed with a further analysis particularly 
for countries which possess explicit CSR activities and perceive CSR as a tool for sustainable 
management. 
 
  The fact that the role of auditing was always important on the part of firms, motivated 
us to proceed with that research. The aim of this research is to explore the link between CSR 
and Audit fees, while we desire to examine the important role of auditing and more specific 
level of audit fees in conjunction with CSR performance.  Further, our purpose is to identify 
how regulatory framework affects CSR performance and hence audit fees. Undoubtedly, 
determination of audit fees is a procedure of great complexity and takes into consideration 
numerous variables. So, in this research, we seek to go a step further  and add CSR performance 
as a variable in the determination of audit fees. We approach our study with quantitative 
methodology, collecting information from Bloomberg Database. We examined listed European 
firms, taking into consideration data from 2012 to 2016. Our results for the first hypothesis 
show that there is a significant positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
audit fees but on the contrary, for heavily regulated countries CSR performance and audit fees 
are associated in a negative way. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in many ways. Firstly, the combination of the 
countries analyzed is pioneering, since there is not an identical research conducted before. The 
sample comes from nineteen countries all over the Europe, including the most acquainted with 
environmental issues. We introduce a link between European CSR policies and audit fees 
determination, taking into consideration the different type of regulation that exists among the 
opted countries. In this aspect, our review aims to offer a deeper understanding of CSR concept 
and to highlight the importance of adopting CSR policies in the European area.  
 
In the next chapters, a prior literature review is analyzed, helping to proceed with the 
hypothesis development and research methodology. Then, model construction is presented 
offering empirical results. Finally, we conclude with the outcomes and our research limitations, 
giving future study initiatives. 
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Literature Review  
CSR reporting, Financial Reporting and Audit Fees  
 
Despite the fact that there is a great extent in the literature between CSR and financial 
performance, CSR and Audit Fees association isn’t clearly determined. So, we seek to expand 
this literature by exploring how CSR performance affects audit fees. Prior studies on the relation 
between CSR and audit fees is few and the results are mixed so, this study contributes to the 
literature by filling that gap. There are two parts that are connected to our study, the 
environmental accounting literature and the audit fee literature. According to current trends on 
CSR reporting many studies have found that companies which act under the concept of 
corporate social responsibility should report on these activities and inform society about 
company’s social engagement (Heemskerk et al., 2002).  Recently, corporate social 
responsibility engagement became not only a matter of large multinational companies, but also 
even small and medium-sized companies have begun to recognize the importance of the 
disclosure of nonfinancial information such as CSR reporting beyond the ordinary annual 
reports (Cheney, 2010). In agreement with the literature, CSR reporting is defined as a 
voluntary corporate action since is not commanded by the law (McWilliams and Siegel 1997; 
Godfrey et al. 2009). In fact, CSR engagement constitutes an important component of audit 
plan and the estimation of audit fees. Auditors have become to recognize the importance of 
CSR and particularly the involvement of CSR activity in audit planning due to the increasing 
importance corresponded to environmental, social and governance issues by investors, 
regulators and capital markets (Watson and Morterio, 2011).  
 
  On the other hand, in Europe, there is a great debate on whether or not is mandatory for 
companies to disclose non- financial information such as CSR activities. In June 2013, the 
legislation on non-financial reporting of the EU amend existing accounting legislation and 
require large companies to disclose information regarding social and environmental policies, 
results, and include anti-corruption issues (Access Now, 2017).2 Clearly, in line with the prior 
                                                          
2 Access Now. (2017). European Parliament approves mandatory corporate social responsibility rules - Access 
Now. [online] Available at: (https://www.accessnow.org/european-parliament-approves-mandatory-corporate-
social-responsibility-rule/). Also, Estelle Masse mentioned that these rules will implemented in companies with 
more than 500 employees. 
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literature, we expect that CSR engagement and in extent the disclosure of quantitative data of 
CSR activities affects significantly audit procedure and the determination of audit fees.  
Determination of Audit Fees 
 
As far as the audit fees are concerned, the results of previous studies on the determinants 
of audit fee (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006) find that the value of an audit is budgeted by 
estimating the hours that are required to conduct an audit. Also, other studies reveal more 
factors that are directly related to audit fees determination such as the auditor’s effort, the 
working risks, and complexity (Hay et al. 2006; Causholli et al. 2011).  But, how is the effort 
of auditors measured?  In a competitive audit market, audit fees are used to measure auditor’s 
effort. Clearly, audit fees should reflect the foreseeable cost of audit hours and the perceived 
business risk (Bell et al. 2001). According to Kim et al. (2012), the more the complexity of an 
audit the more the audit fees. In terms of working risks, prior literature has questioned the effect 
of inherent risk, control risk, and fraud risk. Those risks determine the level of the audit fees 
and reveal that there is a relationship between CSR firm’s performance and level of audit fees. 
But, there is also the possibility of an audit failure (audit risk), thus potential future litigation 
risk should also be considered as a determent of audit fees.  Some studies indicate that the 
higher the levels of risks the higher the auditor’s labor hours (Bell et al. 1994; 2001). Besides 
the audit risk, there are other determinants that affect audit fees. Those are client’s size and 
operation complexity (Hay et al. 2006; De Fond and Zhang 2014). What is more, it is sensible 
that if the audit risk reduced the audit hours that are required would be decreased, resulting in 
fewer audit fees. Although, company size seems to put significant influence on the 
determination of audit fees (Kim, D. Y., & Kim, J. 2013). Further, several studies suggest that 
firms with high leverage are associated with high audit hours (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Dopuch et 
al. 2003; Knechel et al. 2009). Still, there are others stated the opposite (Davis et al. 1993; Stein 
et al. 1994; Davidson and Gist 1996; Bell et al. 2001; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Bell et al. 
2008). Clearly, on the part of auditors, there is need to consider the impact of CSR on client 
risk in their audit. From a corporate aspect, there are inherent risk, control risk and fraud risk 
that may be influenced by adopting CSR policies. Prior research papers have tested how CSR 
affects investments actions, proved that high CSR ratings enhance such financial decisions, due 
to the fact of risk reduction (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015). This study adds more to the existing 
auditing literature by exploring how adoption and reporting of CSR activities impact on audit 
fees.  
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CSR reporting 
 
A definition of CSR report is that provides information about the social and 
environmental implications that are caused by a company’s economic activity (Gray, 2006). 
Though  with the representation of non-financial information companies aims to introduce their 
efforts to eliminate the negative effect of their activities on the society. Thus,  in agreement 
with Chen et al., (2011) CSR reporting could have serious impacts on auditing through 
numerous mechanisms. Many and various insights are provided, according to Kim et al., (2012), 
the first mechanism is that CSR reporting has become an issue of paramount importance since 
investors, customers and other stakeholders insist on more transparency about all features of a 
firm. Additionally, Atkins (2006) suggest that socially responsibility relates to firm’s 
transparency in its financial reporting. In his view, a social responsible firm is more likely to 
expend more resources on auditing to meet ethical expectations with more transparent financial 
information. Given the results of numerous previews studies on CSR reporting, the notification 
of nonfinancial information, such as corporate social responsibility disclosure, is defined as 
instructive for investors (Griffin and Sun 2013; Clarkson et al., 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2012). In the opinion of Dhaliwal et al.  (2012), voluntary environmental 
disclosure becomes more and more informative to the investors.  Researchers also found that 
CSR reports can make available broader information than financial reports (Ramanna, 2013). 
The fact of a socially responsible company, affects not only the potential investors and their 
decisions, but also the relationship with the employees, customers, suppliers, regulators and 
civil society (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015).  
 
Audit Quality, Credibility and Transparency 
 
Moreover, the study of Chen et al., (2016) on the relation between voluntary CSR 
reporting and audit quality, measured by audit fees, suggest that a CSR report issuance is 
committed to higher audit fees. That positive association derives from the necessity of managers 
for credibility. Particularly, the quality and the credibility of the CSR report are defined by the 
dedication of the top management.  Therefore, enhancing confidence in CSR reports and 
making those reports more enlightening for investors affects audit fees. In their perception, for 
higher-quality audits, more resources are needed to be expended. Additionally,  argued that 
financial reporting of high quality builds investors’ confidence and improves firm’s externality 
for disclosing CSR information. (Chen et al. 2016). That positive association suggests that 
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higher quality financial reporting which result in higher audit fees is committed to greater CSR 
reporting credibility. That is to say, auditors must possess education and knowledge about 
environmental regulations and more effort is required to evaluate if social and environmental 
liabilities are being reported on an appropriate way. We hypothesize that auditor’s effort should 
be increased by striving to reduce audit risk to a very low level and provide high-quality 
financial and non-financial reports, resulting in more audit fee. However, some studies argued 
that CSR reporting not only can increase transparency of the social and environmental impacts 
of companies, but also can reduce operating and default risk (Hoi et al., 2013; Deng et al., 2013). 
Engaging in CSR also contribute to firm’s positive reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Du et al. 2010). A socially responsible firm can gain a greater competitive advantage in the 
capital markets (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015). The procedure which is followed to produce 
financial reports it’s the same for CSR reporting as well for Hemingway and Maclagan (2004). 
In their view, a responsible firm should be publicly accountable for both its social performance 
and financial performance.  
 
CSR performance and Audit Fees 
 
According to relevant previous investigations, auditors tend to charge lower fees to 
client firms with extremely high CSR performance and reduce the possibility to issue going 
concern qualifications on their report.  Based on factors such as client’s audit risk and litigation 
risk, the main finding of this research is that auditors value CSR performance in their decision 
making (Chen et al., 2011). What should be mentioned in the above results of the negative 
relation between CSR and audit fees, is that the audit market is supposed to be competitive with 
ceteris paribus and the companies that have been examined were in a great extend U.S. 
companies with the highest market capitalization. Similarly, in our research we select a sample 
comprised of companies with high market capitalization except the fact that we are going to 
investigate European countries.  
 
Alternatively, another research focused on Korean audit market, found that the better a 
company is, the higher level of audit fees finally pays. Companies with excellent CSR ratings, 
pay more audit fees. Reasons that support these findings are that audit fees aren’t determined 
based on auditor’s evaluation results and secondly, Korean excellent companies pay higher 
fees, due to their higher financial standards that increase the audit effort for a thorough audit 
(Kim D. Y. and Kim J., 2013). 
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CSR assurance, financial performance and investments decisions  
 
There are also other factors that motivated our research as that the literature on the 
relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance is controversial. Prior work 
examining the relationship between CSR disclosure and firm value find a positive association 
(Anderson and Frankle, 1980). It has been agreed that socially responsible company has good 
financial performance. Although the research on the link between CSR reporting and financial 
performance are concentrated to exogenous factors that define this relationship (Russo and 
Fouts, 1997). Engagement on CSR affects positively the relationship between stakeholders and 
firm (Agle et al. 1999). However, that relationship is not only affected by exogenous factor but 
also by its absorptive capacity and complementary resources (Zahra and George, 2002). 
Nevertheless, CSR engagement often is expensive. Companies should expend not only major 
investments but also consume time to obtain, for instance, a pollution prevention and there is a 
limitation of time for companies to absorb these resources and experiences (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Penrose, 1959). Besides, on CSR engagement and financial performance Tang 
et al. (2012) reported that firms are engaged toward CSR to obtain the financial benefits 
regardless of contextual factors.   
 
It is important to mention the study of Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) which shows the 
link between investment decisions and CSR ratings. The period examined was 1993-2007, 
sampling USA listed companies. The research showed that analysts were pessimistic in firms 
with high CSR ratings, as they perceived it as an extra cost.  Over time and leading to 2007, 
analysts became less pessimistic and finally issued optimistic recommendations for high CSR 
rated companies. Also, that result is significantly supported by analysts with higher status and 
greater experience. Actually, CSR is a new trend that facilitates operations in the corporate 
world, by eliminating the business risk and contributing to value creation. Despite the fact that 
the previous decade CSR was originated in the United States, now is a worldwide trend and 
based on KPMG 20153 research, Asia-Pacific has become the leading region for CSR reporting. 
So, the impact of CSR assurance is examined in the Chinese market too. It is proved that CSR 
                                                          
3 KPMG. (2015). The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting [online] Available at: 
(https://home.kpmg.com/cn/en/home/insights/2015/12/corporate-responsibility-reporting-2015-chinese-findings-
201512.html) 
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assurance increases investor willingness to invest and the effect is greater when CSR 
disclosures are positive. Moreover, the relationship between assurance and investment 
decisions is partially influenced by the credibility of CSR information, as it is shown in China. 
(Shen H. et al., 2017). 
 
CSR ratings and Earnings Management 
 
Studies regarding the link between CSR and earnings management are not such much. 
Kim et al. (2012) highlights ethical concerns as a motivation for CSR and examines the 
relationship between CSR and earnings management. They claim that firms with social 
responsibility are more transparent to investors. Our study is in favor of the transparent 
financial reporting hypothesis  as  well as the research of Kim et al. (2012). According to their 
hypothesis  ethical managers are attached to CSR activities to meet ethical expectations, be 
honest and trustful. Prior literature on the ethical form of CSR also conclude firms with good 
CSR performance are more likely to provide more transparent financial information and 
constrain earnings management (Jones, 1995, Carroll, 1979) .  
 
However, another study focused on the opportunistic use of CSR investigate if 
companies use CSR strategies such as corporate philanthropy programs to conceal earnings 
management (Prior et al., 2008). They insisted that earnings management and CSR are 
positively associated in regulated companies, while for unregulated companies their result were 
statistically insignificant.  Due to the inconsistent from prior research it is difficult to draw a 
clear conclusion. In a study investigating the relationship between Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure and earnings management, using UK Government’s environmental KPI, Sun et al. 
(2010), reported that corporate governance mechanisms like the audit committee diligence, 
affect the relationship between earnings management and  corporate environmental disclosure. 
Moreover, they result in an insignificant link, since managers act on their own benefit and base 
their decisions to their interests, so they are motivated either to increase or decrease the 
earnings.  
 
What is more,  firm size appearing to be positively related to corporate environmental 
disclosure (Prior et al. 2008). Additionally, in a very recent review on the link of audit fees with 
earning management Martinez and Moraes (2017).  Identified that fewer audit fees lead to low-
quality reports and increase the risk of misreported earnings. Companies that pay lower than 
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the expected audit fees, could negatively affect the audit procedure and auditors reports quality, 
permitting earnings management in their financial statements. These results also supported 
from financial analysts who base their decision making in earnings quality, to come up with 
investment recommendations.  
 
Prior literature has shown that CSR reporting and more specific disclosure of positive 
CSR information as the corporate nonfinancial disclosure, relates to ethical managers. Also, it 
has a positive contribution to firm’s social responsible reputation and attaches importance to its 
corporate image (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim 2015). A good 
CSR performance and CSR reporting it’s a signal of responsible management and is suggestive 
of a great managerial integrity4 . In other words, managers try to enhance their trustworthiness 
through CSR commitment. We should give attention to the  research of Christensen (2015) 
which finds that firms that report on CSR have good financial performance and are not likely 
to be involved in high-profile misconduct. Managers to maximize the credibility and reliability 
of firm’s CSR reporting are willing to disburse more money for auditing which in turn lead to 
paying more audit fees. Consistent with this concern Ball et al (2012) argue that auditing is a 
mechanism through which managers can attach credibility to their voluntary CSR reporting.  
 
Manipulation of CSR and scandals 
 
Complementary, many studies focus on the opportunistic use of CSR on the part of 
managers. There is the possibility that managers might be attached to CSR practices as a cover-
up for opportunistic incentives (Hemingway and Maclagan 2004). This means, that some 
managers have different motives for adopting CSR policies like personal moral concerns and 
personal values that impact on their decision making. As a result, they act individually, on their 
own opinion and judgment about company’s strategy. Thus, CSR conceal a self-motivated 
management with ambiguity in corporate rules. If managers are linked to CSR practices to cover 
a corporate misconduct, then they are likely to deceive stakeholders. Subsequently, audit fees 
would be increased due to the higher effort and risk for the auditor. To reveal such cases, more 
audit effort is required in order to find out and separate individual from organization values and 
determine whether actual CSR policies are implemented. As far as the legitimacy theory is 
                                                          
4 Connelly et al. 2011 mentioned  “Signaling theory” and other research papers have referred to that giving 
findings that suggest managers might engage to CSR to signal their integrity  though disclosure (Trueman, 1986; 
Verrechia, 2001)  
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concerned, many doubts have been continually erased about mechanisms that manipulate CSR 
reporting (Gray 1987, 1988, 1991). In agreement with this fact, Bebbigtone and Gray (2001), 
identified that the influence of managerial interests on CSR agenda is an ever-present threat. 
An example for such cases is the Enron scandal. After the Enron fallout, most of the big firms 
and multinational companies, get accustomed to CSR policies and sustainability reporting. The 
factors that push the companies in a CSR route, were the reputation, the risk management, and 
the competitive advantage, however, the discharge of accountability and the transparency have 
not been full filled (Owen, 2005). So, another issue that comes up, is the significance of critical 
engagement in CSR policies and reporting, leading to a necessary reconceptualization.  
 
Moreover, Owen (2005) noted that there are many obstacles in adopting new practices 
and in reporting newly associated accountings in practice, due to the macro level market 
constraints and the perceived economic realities. This point is also supported from Harte and 
Owen in 1987 that examined the social cost of U.K. local authorities in the audit procedure, 
including the social impact. The conclusions of this paper were the determination of an initial 
framework which in that period time, assisted the audit procedure. In their opinion, the 
knowledge of the problems are faced and the assessment of CSR information could help in 
establishing a detailed framework (Harte and Owen 1987).  
 
As it is widely known, stakeholders with the greatest economic power, put more 
influence in decision making than the economically weaker stakeholders. Manager’s major duty 
is to support stakeholders’ interest. Going a step deeper, the opportunistic managerial conduct 
could begin from the stakeholders’ interests too. Unerman and Benett (2004) concluded that 
companies with supposedly established social, environmental, economic and ethical 
responsibilities should develop enforcement mechanisms to ensure the fulfillment of their moral 
duties. In the same vein, Thompson and Bebbington (2005) highlighted the need to pay more 
attention to the user’s reports and the necessity of more careful and sophisticated reading of 
accounts that concern social and environmental reporting. Both the reviews, showed a call for 
reform of managerial control and manipulation of the stakeholder dialogue process (Unerman 
and Benett 2004, Thompson and Bebbington 2005), in order to ensure transparency and 
efficiency in communication and reports. All these factors, made the Audit Reporting more 
onerous and the Audit Role more demanding, thus more Audit Effort is required nowadays. 
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Mandatory CSR framework as a weapon toward the manipulation 
 
A theme that is raised from the above argues, is if the corporate social responsibility 
disclosure can be manipulated or not. The paucity of previous literature, does not allow to 
justify a clear opinion, but there are some important points worthy to stated. Corporate social 
disclosure is supposed to engender societal skepticism and be a component of legitimacy 
process, but in fact, this is doomed to failure taking into consideration that legitimacy is rarely 
attained (O’Dwyer, 2002). In contrast to O’Dwyer (2002) study in Ireland, O’ Donovan (1999) 
carried out that managers in Australia found useful in maintaining and re-establishing 
legitimacy, the consideration of the annual corporate social disclosure report. This difference 
may be due to the mandatory environmental disclosure in Australia, whereas in Ireland and in 
the majority of the countries globally is voluntary.  
 
More specifically, in Australia that the social reporting was statutory from the 1st of July 
in 1998, the prior voluntary regime failed to disclose companies that have broken the law (Frost, 
2007 consistent with Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Thus, with the mandatory social disclosure, 
the transparency is increased and companies that had breached regulations can be unveiled. 
(Frost, 2007). To illustrate the efficiency of the mandatory disclosure of CSR practices and 
activities, the case of India, proved that companies listed on Bombay Stock Exchange were 
forced by the law to disclose and were significantly improved in governance, social and 
environmental aspect (Boodoo, 2006). 
 
Previous research demonstrated that the quality of CSR reporting has positively 
influenced by the legal obligation of CSR scores disclosure (Habek and Wolniak, 2016). 
Besides, Habek and Wolniak, (2016) linked mandatory reporting with increased credibility, due 
to the external verification that international standards require. So, as Habek and Wolniak in 
2016, noted that “ultimately, the construction of the regulation and the individual policy of each 
country can put influence on the quality of the reports”.  
 
On the other hand, Peters and Romi, (2013), conducted a research in the US and shown 
that mandatory disclosure does not guarantee more efficient environmental reporting, because 
additional reporting requirements do not necessarily result in the real change from 
organizations. The change implies control and clear monitor in order to disclose sanction 
information or any unintended discretion on the part of management. The findings showed that 
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judicial proceedings are not adequate and cannot allow efficient and complete control of the 
management disclosure decisions.  
 
Gamerschlag et al. (2011) in conjunction with political cost theory, reported that more 
CSR disclosure, lead to higher profitability of the firms. After, examining German companies 
it is showed that higher visibility, more spreader shareholder structure and relationship with US 
stakeholders (enhance cross-listing), are positively connected with CSR disclosure score, even 
if Germany has a voluntary framework.  
 
Barbu et. al. (2014) examined the existed regulation in France, United Kingdom, and 
Germany, noted that adoption of IASs/IFRSs standards does not offer harmonization in 
accounting policies through the countries because are applied differently from one to another 
firm or country. Similarly, Nobes in 2006, demonstrated that national accounting traditions 
affect the financial reporting behavior, even if generalized standards like IASs/IFRSs, have 
been applied. This fact does not allow full convergence of accounting practices and full 
comparability of disclosed information across firms and countries. In more detail, Germany 
hasn’t adopted mandatory guidelines for environmental disclosure, while UK and France have 
a developed regulation system regarding the environmental information, mostly for listed and 
large non-listed companies. The main outcomes of Barbu et. al. (2014) research, were that the 
firm size affects positively the environmental reporting since big firms disclose more 
information than smaller and secondly, countries with lack of strong constraining 
environmental disclose regulations (i.e. Germany) report less environmental information than 
UK and France.  
 
Regarding the study of Ioannou and Serafeim (2017), Nowadays companies desire to 
ensure their comparability and to increase their credibility. So, even without a mandatory 
framework, companies have the propensity to adopt relative reporting guidelines. These efforts 
for increasing corporate transparency, show that there are improvements in disclosure quality 
and quantity. Thus, voluntary disclosure offer significant positive results to the society and to 
the firms, increasing their corporate value. Moreover, as Deegan and Rankin observed in 1996 
“the fact that companies were now disclosing on negative environmental performance may in 
itself has been the catalyst for increased total disclosures”. Based on these results can be easily 
suggested that mandatory CSR disclosure, push countries to disclosure more and to get familiar 
with new necessary trends, overcoming their past reporting traditions. 
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As a result, mandatory CSR reporting isn’t the key to effectiveness and transparency. 
This stems from the deep understanding of the value of CSR and the willingness of firms or 
countries to adopt CSR policies voluntarily, recognizing all the advantages that CSR activities 
offer to them and to the environment that they operate or exist. The mandatory framework could 
be a milestone in control, by establishing specific materiality thresholds that enable more 
accurate scores. 
 
To sum up, according to previews literature on CSR and the link with audit fees is hard 
to draw a clear conclusion. One argument in favor of CSR is that CSR practices generate greater 
transparency on the part of firms.  That is to say, CSR constrains the information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. Socially responsible firms are more aware of the social and 
the environmental impacts of their activities but have also altered significantly internal 
management practices with better internal control processes. Through a more detailed analysis, 
such transparency result in lower audit fees. Another point in favor of CSR reporting is that 
enhances firm’s reputation. For example, managers view CSR activities as an expedient to build 
or maintain firm’s reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Verschoor, 2005; Linthicum et al., 
2010). Thus, managers to avoid any potential damage to firms, use CSR to eliminate earnings 
management. Not to mention that managers use CSR reporting to communicate to investors 
future financial performance (Lys T. et al. 2015). Firms engaged in socially responsible 
behavior to have a better information environment and improve their overall performance 
which results in lower risk for auditors. On the other hand, there are some studies that have 
been skeptical about the opportunistic use of CSR. That is, managers might use CSR to pursue 
self-interest and advance their careers or as a cover-up for corporate misconduct. Such a use of 
CSR would contribute to the increase of audit fees. Moreover, if manager’s opportunistic 
behavior prevail stakeholders would have wrong signals of firm’s value and financial 
performance. In other words, stakeholders have the impression that the firm is transparent, 
while actually firm operates in respect of earning management.  
 
All in all, CSR performance creates more ethical management, increases transparency, 
reduces information asymmetry, establishes better internal control process, enhances 
investment decisions, contributes to going concern decision and increases the quality of pre-
audit earnings. 
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Hypothesis development 
Our research is based on ethical theories, such theories stated that firms view CSR as 
an ethical obligation (Carroll 1979, Jones 1995, Phillips et al. 2003). Managers act on behalf of 
a moral framework, urging managers to ‘do the right thing’. Furthermore, managers also have 
incentives to be ethical, trustworthy and honest due to the positive impact of such behavior on 
firm’s reputation (Jones 1995). In consistence with the notion that managers are ethical and 
use CSR in a moral way, we hypothesize that managers are willing to expend more resources 
to auditing. By doing so, they enchase transparency of firms financial reporting and signal a 
more socially responsible behavior. So, socially responsible companies are expected to be more 
transparent in their financial reporting. 
 
Despite the positive effects that CSR reporting offered to the firms, in accordance with 
the prior literature, CSR reports seem to lack credibility (Chen et al. 2016). Credibility is an 
important characteristic of disclosed information and is useful in decision making. Simnett et 
al. (2009) stated that a credible accounting information is the one that exposed to lower noise 
or lower bias. The lack of credibility may come from the absence of a common reporting 
framework and from the differences in accounting policies. In more detail, the disclosure of 
nonfinancial information such as CSR, depends on the reliability and the credibility of the CSR 
engagement. In a sustainability reporting, the credibility of the disclosed information is such 
significant as is financial reporting (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). This exists for companies 
that are inclined to adopt the extra cost of gaining assurance for sustainability reporting to 
signaling sustainable development to stakeholders.  
 
Additionally, from auditors’ side,  with the disclosure of CSR information the scope of 
the audit becomes bigger because they have the obligation to assess not only the financial 
information, but also the nonfinancial activities such as CSR. So, for the better quality of 
nonfinancial information more resources are needed and more effort from the auditors, which 
logically will result in greater audit fees. Another factor that results in greater effort from 
auditors to evaluate CSR activities and provide assurance for them is the absence of a common 
framework. According to prior literature, CSR reports issued firms with outstanding CSR 
performance (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). On the other hand, if mandatory laws and regulations 
established, the firms with the outstanding performance of CSR will have to make greater effort 
to differentiate themselves from other companies. That will result in greater expenditures on 
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the part of firms and consequently, greater effort from auditors to issue sustainability reports of 
greater credibility (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2017). In the opinion of Chen et al. (2011) the higher 
the audit quality, the higher the credibility of CSR reports.   
 
Based on the foreign arguments, firms are willing to pay greater amounts to auditors in 
order to achieve financial reporting of better quality.  Therefore, we expect a positive relation 
between CSR and Audit Fees. We propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  A)Firms with strong CSR performance are committed to higher audit fees. There 
is a positive association between CSR and audit fees.   
B) Firms with strong CSR performance are committed to lower audit fees. There 
is a negative association between CSR and audit fees.  
It should be mentioned that CSR performance will be tested here with the use of ESG 
disclosure score. As the aforementioned, we noticed that there are different regulatory policies 
and frameworks, either voluntary or mandatory, across the world. This fact exists even among 
European countries that we are going to examine. Countries have their accounting traditions 
and perceive CSR concept in a different way. Thereby, every country has various approaches 
in CSR disclosure, based on its sensitivity in CSR issues. At this stage, it is important to mention 
the way that European Authorities define Corporate Social Responsibility: “A concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2017)5. The 
voluntary character of CSR strategies interferes with the homogeneity within the EU.  
Moreover, companies across Europe operate under different circumstances to achieve a 
sustainable development. To illustrate this, the economic situation is different from country to 
country, even the impact of social issues and environmental issues is not the same. The fact that 
CSR engagement is a voluntary decision to be made by companies in addition to the absence 
of strong regulatory framework in most European countries deteriorate the existence of similar 
criteria across all European countries. Thus, there is a possibility across Europe, auditors to 
count the impacts of CSR on companies in a different way. To increase the robustness of our 
research, we would like to examine the effect of ESG score on Audit Fees, taking into 
                                                          
5 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52002DC0347) 
   (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:n26034)  
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consideration that auditors’ opinion may be vary from country to country. Such changes derive 
from how the existence of CSR reporting regulations affect its country and hence the CSR 
engagement for companies. Moreover, some European countries have developed a regulatory 
framework for sustainability reporting pointing to the improvement of companies’ ESG 
performance. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2:  A) In countries where CSR reporting is heavily regulated, CSR performance 
results in lower audit fees.  
 B) In countries where CSR reporting is not heavily regulated, CSR  
  performance results in higher audit fees.    
Even though both hypotheses H1 and H2 test the impact of corporate social 
responsibility on audit fees, H2 concentrates to how auditor’s perception may chance when the 
countries change. Hypothesis H2 implies that auditors across countries understand in a different 
way CSR activities. To examine the empathy of countries to CSR, we proceed with a 
macroeconomic and environmental research taking relevant information from Yale University 
investigations on a state level basis. To measure the environmental performance of countries 
the Environmental Performance Index was developed by Yale University and Columbia 
University in conjunction with World Economic Forum, Joint Research \Center and European 
Commission. More specific, the EPI provides information concerning the environmental health 
and the ecosystem vitality. We have chosen this index because, from 2012 (the initial year for 
our research), a new “Pilot trend EPI” was designed to rank countries for their environmental 
performance changes. The ranking comparison with previous years, reveal which country was 
improved and which was followed a negative way.   Another advantage of EPI usage is that 
exceed the overall rankings by offering issue-by issue metrics that enable the internal control 
and the comparison with neighbors and peers (Epi.yale.edu, 2017).6 This comparison is very 
useful for our sample since it is consisting of European countries. Our sample is comprised of 
many different European countries. Northern countries such as Finland and Sweden is defined 
as global leaders in CSR, as they are at the top of CSR ranking.  Moreover, companies which 
are based there, perform very well in CSR performance measurements. For instance, 
measurements for company-level involve Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) and Global 
                                                          
6 Environmental Performance Index- Development: Epi.yale.edu. (2017). Environmental Performance Index - 
Development. [online] Available at: (http://www.epi.yale.edu/). 
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Index 100 (Strand et al. 2015). For country-level there is the Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI) as we have already mentioned, which provide us a valuable country-level performance 
indicator. In EPI’s 2016, ranking Northern European countries fared exceptionally well, with 
Finland at number 1, Sweden number 2, and Denmark at number 3, (see table 9 appendix). So, 
to examine auditor’s reaction to CSR across Europe based on how sensitive is each country to 
CSR activities, we had first to focus on Northern European countries that globally score higher 
in CSR performances.  Scandinavian countries -Finland, Sweden, Denmark- and their 
corporations ranked high for strong ethical behavior (World Economic Forum, 2003; IESE 
Business School)7. In such counties CSR engagement is not only an environmental issue but 
also societal. They are focused on human rights and working conditions, and they operate in a 
responsible way (Habisch et al. 2005). 
In Scandinavian countries, sustainability reporting was adopted prior to respective 
regulation (Strand et al. 2015).  In Denmark, social responsibility reports (Danish Financial 
Statement Act) were enforced for companies with specific characteristics. More specific a 
balance sheet total of DKK 156 million and net revenue of DKK 313 million determine large 
companies and force them to disclose.8  Moreover, companies that having or not social 
responsibility policies, they are forced to notify them in their management report (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2017).  With such procedures, governments perform decisively to mandate CSR and 
to be integrated within the regulatory framework. The mandating role of CSR has become more 
and more popular in Scandinavia and to some extent to Northern European countries. It is 
important to mention that for companies in Finland social responsibility issue was of paramount 
importance for decades now. In addition, Finnish corporations are focused on doing business 
right and have high standards for morality and business ethics, the majority of Finnish 
corporations exposed to environmental awareness. What is more, Finnish government not only 
encourages corporations to commit to CSR but also emphasizes on CSR reporting as a voluntary 
form. Finnish companies are not forced to increase CSR behavior through regulation because 
they already have environmental and social consciousness and in that way they benefit (Habisch 
et al. 2005). 
                                                          
7 World Economic Forum (2003). Global competitiveness report 2003-2004. Davos Switzerland,  
Iese.edu. (2017).  [online] Available at: (http://www.iese.edu/es/files/5_7341.pdf)  
 
8 Danishbusinessauthority.dk. (2017). [online] Available at: 
(https://danishbusinessauthority.dk/sites/default/files/media/guidance_on_target_figures_policies_and_reporting
_on_the_gender_composition_of_management.pdf)  
 
19 
 
We expect that disclosure regulation influences CSR practices and that in countries 
where sustainability reporting is approached in a more systematic manner such as in Finland, 
Sweden, and Denmark a significant effect in audit fees is highlighted. Due to the fact that they 
are more sensitive toward corporate social responsibility and disclosure of such information is 
more regulated than other countries. Particularly prior researchers state that the more the 
evaluable information the better the environmental performance (Konar and Cohen 1997, 
Scorse and Schlenker, 2012). Hypothesis H2 captures the differences in CSR engagement 
among countries and investigates the relationship between auditors’ perception and CSR 
activities of leading countries on CSR rating. The results will contribute to the understanding 
of the relationship between CSR and audit fees. 
Research Design 
Data and Sample Selection, Measurement of CSR  
 
To test our hypotheses, we choose a longitudinal sample of nineteen different countries 
of Europe. The countries which comprise our sample are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland. The CSR data used in 
this study are not similar to those were used in prior studies (Chen et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2012; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011).  
 
Since our research is held in Europe we measure firms CSR performance using the ESG 
Disclosure score rating assigned by Bloomberg database, so the first criterion under which we 
select our sample was the ESG Disclosure score.9 Since 2009, Bloomberg has established an 
ESG Disclosure score and its three sub-scores Environmental (E), Social (S), Governance (G) 
on actual number, to evaluate company’s environmental, social and governance performance. 
That score is founded on the disclosure activities of companies connected to their ESG activities 
and particularly is based on quantitative ESG data, having or not a sustainability report. The 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure score is defined as a measurement of risk. Also, sustainability and 
                                                          
9 Ratesustainability.org. (2017). Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Scores. [online] Available at: 
(http://ratesustainability.org/hub/index.php/search/at-a-glance-product/24/99),  
Ga-institute.com. (2017). G&A. [online] Available at: (https://www.ga-institute.com/),  
Bloomberg L.P. (2017). Bloomberg Impact | Sustainability at Bloomberg | Bcause. [online] Available at: 
(https://www.bloomberg.com/bcause/#home)   
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ethical impacts of an investment are identified by the ESG score. Bloomberg provides a rating 
score which is based on actual data from sustainability reports, annual reports and company 
websites. Any ESG data are computed by a mathematical model.   ESG score is ranged from 
zero to hundred (0-100), zero for companies that do not report on social and environmental 
issues and 100 for companies that report explicitly ESG data. To be more specific, the higher 
amount of ESG score, reveal a very sensitive firm in CSR issues, with developed CSR policies. 
In fact, what is assessing is the volume of the disclosed information about companies’ CSR 
activities. So, firms that publish sustainability reports are scoring higher on the Bloomberg ESG 
Disclosure scores, than those who do not report.  Apart from ESG data, audit fees, financial 
information, and non-financial information, were all downloaded from Bloomberg database too 
and all data are measured in Euro.  We choose Bloomberg database because of the availability 
of Environmental, Social, Governance information for Europe. In contrast to other sources, 
Bloomberg cover more than 10.000 companies worldwide in ESG data and that is very 
important for our research because we have a greater amount of available data for the nineteen 
countries of interest. For that nineteen under investigation countries, we started collecting 
information by downloading data from Bloomberg, for companies that have available ESG 
data, since 2012. Our initial sample comprises companies which are listed and have available 
all the information which are required to conduct our research as ESG score rating, audit fees, 
financial even non-financial data for years 2012-2016, reaching the 3585 observations. After a 
necessary reduction, due to the lack of some financial data, our sample shrinks to 2049 firm-
year observations or 571 unique firms group spanning the period 2012-2016.  For both 
hypotheses H1 and H2 the sample is remaining the same but sample size may change in various 
regressions when different countries are under scrutiny.  
 
To be more concise, below Table1 shows all the countries that consist our sample, and 
presents how many companies come from each country. As it can be clearly seen, France is the 
country with the highest partition. Germany follows with a little difference and then 
Switzerland, Netherlands and North European countries, appear a lot in the examined sample.  
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Table 1: Sample Description- Distribution for Firm-Year observations by country 
 
Country Frequency Percent Cum. 
Slovakia 13 0.36 0.36 
Lithuania 5 0.14 0.50 
Slovenia 15 0.42 0.92 
Estonia 21 0.59 1.51 
Latvia 7 0.20 1.70 
Czech Republic 26 0.73 2.43 
Luxembourg 54 1.51 3.93 
Poland 132 3.68 7.62 
Denmark 177 4.94 12.55 
Finland 219 6.11 18.66 
Austria 122 3.40 22.06 
Norway 294 8.20 30.26 
Ireland 130 3.63 33.89 
France 607 16.93 50.82 
Belgium 140 3.91 54.73 
Switzerland 423 11.80 66.53 
Germany 561 15.65 82.18 
Netherlands 235 6.56 88.73 
Sweden 404 11.27 100.00 
Total 3,585 100.00  
 
 
What should be mentioned regarding the examined sample is that the firms are not 
restricted in European stock exchanges, but many of them are cross-listed in several stock 
exchanges. Again, France, Germany, Sweden and Northern Stock Index are the stock markets 
with the highest participation in our research (see table 8 appendix). 
Also, in the Table 2 below, it can be noticed that 2015 was the year with the highest 
level of accessible data and one year later, there was a significant reduction in information 
availability. 
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Table 2: Sample Description-Distribution for Firm-Years observation by years 
 
Empirical model and Variable Definitions  
To test hypothesis H1 and demonstrate the relationship between CSR performance and 
audit fees, we compute the following model. 
Our regression model is specified as follows:  
𝐿𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4
∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏7 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏8
∗ 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏9 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉1𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏10 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏11 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑏12 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏13 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏14 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where: 
 𝐿𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  = the natural log of company’s audit fee, in time t 
𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡  = company’s corporate social responsibility index measured with  
  ESG disclosure score, in time t 
Control variables: 
𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 = company’s auditor dummy in time t (1 if the firm is audited by PWC, EY, 
  Deloitte, KPMG companies and 0 otherwise)  
𝐿𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 = the natural log of market value of equity, in time t 
𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡= dummy in time t, that equals with 1 if the firm has profit and 0 if the firm 
    has loss 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡    = the firm’s total liabilities divided by its total assets, in time t 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = company’s return on asset in time t 
FYEAR Freq. Percent Cum. 
2012 684 19.08 19.08 
2013 730 20.36 39.44 
2014 772 21.53 60.98 
2015 804 22.43 83.40 
2016 595 16.60 100.00 
Total 3,585 100.00  
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𝑀𝑇𝐵2𝑖𝑡 = the firm’s market to book ratio defined as its market value of equity divided by book 
value of its equity, in  time t 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 =the sum of the firm’s receivables and inventory divided by its total assets, in time t 
𝑅𝐸𝑉1𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 = growth rate in sales over the previous fiscal year, in time t 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = Age of the company (in years) 
𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 = company’s end of fiscal year in time t dummy, equals to 1 if it ends on  
  31/12/20XX, or equals to 0 otherwise. 
𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 = dummy in time t that equals to 1 if ROA>=- 0.5 and ROA<=0.5 or equals to 0 
otherwise. 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡= dummy variable for the country 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = dummy variable for the year 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = error  
 
To develop the audit fee model, we based on prior literature to identify the factors that 
are most known to associate with audit fees (Simunic 1980, Crasweel et al. 1995, Hay et al. 
2006) These factors are auditor’s quality (𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌), in general companies which are 
audited by Big4 committed to higher audit fees. Moreover, audit complexity measured by the 
market value of equity (𝐿𝑀𝑉𝐸) which shows the size of the client, we expect that large size 
clients have greater audit complexity. Also, other indicators of great audit complexity are a 
lower ROA, particularly lower ROA demonstrates high leverage which signals a greater 
financial risk. Generally ROA is used to signal firm’s financial performance, according to 
Kothari et al. (2005) we contain (𝑅𝑂𝐴) to control the effect of  performance on earnings 
manipulation, we  also use  the variables (𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌, 𝑀𝑇𝐵2, 𝐿𝑅𝐸𝑉, 𝐴𝐺𝐸, 𝐿𝐸𝑉, 𝑅𝑂𝐴).   
 
Additionally, we employ another control variable to evaluate the possibility of earnings 
manipulation, the  (𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿) dummy. In the area  that (𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿) dummy equals to 1, there is a 
higher possibility for management’s opportunistic use and so, audit risk becomes greater. 
Another factor is the inherent risk which represented by items that needed specific audit 
procedure as inventories and receivables that are related to audit fees in a positive way 
(𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉). Thus, the results are expected to be higher for bigger amounts of inventory and 
receivables. For engagement attributes (Hay et. al 2006), we use the fiscal year end dummy 
variable (𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌). In common thinking if the fiscal year ends on 31 of December the 
workload is bigger for every auditor.   For the sales growth rate (𝑅𝐸𝑉1𝑌𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡) and the 
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age of the firm (𝐴𝐺𝐸) we could not have a clear prediction because there is an inconsistency to 
the previews literature. But as long as a company is getting older and older there is a possibility 
to change its financial and environmental behavior.   In the notion of Musteen et al. (2009) the 
age of a firm is connected in a positive way with its financial performance.   
 
Finally, for the dependent variable we employ the natural logarithm of audit fees 
(𝐿𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇) as all the prior researchers have done. To avoid excessive results, we generate a 
variable, named (WREVGR) that cut down extreme prices at the top and bottom of the level of 
5% without ignoring or delete them from the sample. 
 
To test hypothesis H2, based on EPI values on 2016, we conduct an analysis to evaluate 
the effect of regulations on countries. We formulate two different groups comprised of (a) 
Scandinavian countries only (based on EPI full report 2016, Finland peaked at 90.68 EPI score, 
Sweden noted 90.43 and Denmark marked with 89.2) and the second group (b) all the remained 
sixteen counties. Consequently, the first sample consists of 536 observations with 141 groups 
and the second include 1513 observations from 430 groups. Overall 2049 observations and 
groups 571. So, we employ the (High) dummy variable which is equal to 0 for all the other 
countries and equal to 1 for Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia, and Estonia. Since Northern 
countries are at the top of CSR ranking, the interaction with fees should be stronger.  
For the two groups, we regress the already existed model, as before, without considering 
the (BIG4DUMMY). Continuously, we regress the full model, taking into consideration all the 
countries. We create two extra variables the (High1), to present the difference in audit fees in 
High countries and the (High1*ESGSCORE) to capture any extra effect that may exist from 
High companies to audit fees.  Since we have examined separately the countries in the form of 
two groups, effects of countries and years will not be presented for the better understanding of 
the outputs. So, for the hypothesis H2 we formulate the below regression model: 
𝐿𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝐿𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏5 ∗ 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑏6 ∗ 𝑊𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏7 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏8 ∗ 𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏9
∗ 𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏10 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏11 ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏12
∗ (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ1 ∗ 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏13 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Empirical Results 
The CSR performance of each country is presented below, estimated by ESG disclosure 
scores from 2012 to 2016. What is more, the given percentages are on average, unveiling a 
general total CSR view for the under investigation European countries. 
Table 3: Description of ESG Scores per country- year in Data Sample 
COUNTRY FYEAR 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria 27.98 29.53 32.05 32.44 36.43 
Belgium 25.06 27.07 28.24 27.77 34.41 
Czech Republic 18.52 16.06 16.20 20.91 21.14 
Denmark 29.83 29.07 28.87 29.27 32.75 
Estonia 17.22 18.29 18.00 19.73  
Finland 38.69 41.53 42.23 43.07 47.71 
France 38.16 42.15 44.40 44.94 47.62 
Germany 26.92 28.53 30.45 31.22 37.37 
Ireland 22.68 21.50 23.22 22.88 25.65 
Latvia 9.50 11.36 10.54 9.30  
Lithuania 22.11 18.59 21.07 23.14  
Luxembourg 24.32 23.79 24.15 25.99 28.44 
Netherlands 32.59 32.40 34.72 34.86 34.60 
Norway 20.48 22.53 23.66 24.86 28.49 
Poland 12.92 17.15 20.83 21.63 19.76 
Slovakia 6.31 15.93 18.64 25.61 31.41 
Slovenia 31.13 33.33 34.19 31.51 17.36 
Sweden 34.17 34.92 35.05 34.77 36.02 
Switzerland 29.07 30.86 31.62 32.43 36.34 
 
In the above Table (Table 3), it can be easily noticed that Finland and France are the 
dominant countries in CSR policies through the years. Then Sweden follows with high ESG 
disclosure scores with a gradual increase till 2016, whereas in 2015 there was a slight reduction. 
Moreover, Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Austria and lately in 2016 Denmark, are 
countries that reached high enough ratings, as well. Except for Latvia that noted the worst ESG 
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scores, all the other examined countries showed a propensity to disclose more info concerning 
Environmental, Social and Governance issues over the years. That automatically made them 
more socially responsible in their operations, since they achieved higher rates in 2016 from 
what they were used to in 2012. Also here, it should be mentioned that Slovakia prepared the 
most extreme development in CSR, as in 2012 began with the lowest score and then was 
increased rapidly till 2016. Last, as it can be clearly seen, there is a general trend of European 
countries to enhance CSR practices and report a bigger amount of information regarding CSR. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive stats of all variables in the cross-sectional model 
 
Statistics 
 
mean 
p5 
min 
p50  
median 
p95 
max 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
N 
AUDITFEES 7.021 0.195 2.100 29.700 13.401 2.516.000 
LAUDIT 0.800 -1.625 0.742 3.391 1.598 2.514.000 
MVE 8.86 1.65 2.61 3.62 1.96 3.585.000 
LMVE 21.694 18.922 21.684 24.312 1.626 3.585.000 
NETINCDUMMY 0.859 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.348 3.585.000 
LEV 0.600 0.262 0.590 0.942 0.224 3.585.000 
ROA 3.740 -7.160 3.750 16.070 13.116 3.585.000 
MTB2 2.643 0.463 1.719 7.503 9.313 3.585.000 
RINV 0.234 0.030 0.226 0.474 0.142 2.903.000 
WREVGR 4.007 -19.740 2.950 33.900 12.496 3.585.000 
SMALL 0.071 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.257 3.585.000 
AGE 34.877 5.000 24.000 100.000 29.359 3.397.000 
BIG4DUMMY 0.924 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.265 3.374.000 
ENDDUMMY 0.902 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.297 3.585.000 
ESGSCORE 32.664 7.050 33.470 58.330 16.415 3.585.000 
 
Table 4, presents descriptive statistics for all the variables in our cross-sectional model, 
including some extra initial variables to understand deeper the values (i.e.: AUDITFEES, MVE 
and BIG4DUMMY). The mean (median) value of Audit Fees (AUDITFEES) is $7.02 million 
($2.100 million), suggesting a big amount, so in the regression model we use the natural 
logarithm of audit fees (LAUDIT) with an average of 0.800 exceeding the median of 0.742. 
Similarly, due to the excessive amount of Market Capitalization, mean (median) with $8.86 
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billion ($2.61 billion), we take again the natural logarithm of Market value of equity the 
(LMVE) , indicating that on average the examined firms are very big and our sample is 
economically significant. The 92.4 percent of our sample firms are audited by a Big4 auditor, 
so here we do not expect the (BIG4DUMMY) to have a strong effect on our model. About 90.2 
percent of firms have a fiscal year end on 31st of December every year and the mean (median) 
value of our firm age is approximately 35 years (24 years). Around 86 percent of the sample 
companies are issuing profit and have a ROA values 3.7, almost same with the median. 
Regarding the key variable of (ESGSCORE) which is fluctuated from 7.050 to 58.330, the mean 
of 32.7, slightly lower than the median (33.5), confirms that the firms of our sample have highly 
developed social behavior. 
 
In Table 5 below a Spearman correlation matrix is provided, revealing correlations 
between the variables of our sample. What stands out on the table is that (ESGSCORE) is highly 
positively correlated with (LAUDIT) and with all the other examined variables, except the 
(SMALL). That indicates that CSR ratings can influence decisions for increasing the level of 
audit pricing, supporting our first hypothesis. Additionally, the firm’s size that is represented 
by (LMVE) shows a strong positive correlation with (LAUDIT) and a very significant 
correlation with (ESGSCORE), as previous research has similarly proved (Sun et al., 2010). A 
positive correlation is found among (ROA), (LAUDIT) and (ESGSCORE), consistent with the 
observations of the line chart below (Figure 1). Also, what is worthy to be said, is that 
(WREVGR) has an important negative correlation with (LAUDIT) at the level of 5% and 
stronger negative correlation with (ESGSCORE) at the level of 1%.  
 
Figure 1:Time Trends of ESG score, Audit Fees and Return on Assets 
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Table 5: CORRELATION MATRIX 
  LAUDIT LMVE NETINCDUMMY LEV ROA MTB2 RINV WREVGR SMALL AGE ENDDUMMY ESGSCORE 
  b b b b b b b b b b b b 
LAUDIT 1.000 . . . . . . . . . . . 
LMVE 0.596*** 1.000 . . . . . . . . . . 
NETINCDUMMY 0.104*** 0.279*** 1.000 . . . . . . . . . 
LEV 0.169*** 0.032 -0.070*** 1.000 . . . . . . . . 
ROA 0.073*** 0.283*** 0.590*** 
-
0.142*** 1.000 . . . . . . . 
MTB2  -0.015 0.065*** 0.050** -0.018 0.118*** 1.000 . . . . . . 
RINV  -0.032 -0.106*** 0.145*** 0.044** 0.150*** 0.026 1.000 . . . . . 
WREVGR  -0.046** 0.018 0.183*** 
-
0.100*** 0.222*** 0.073*** 0.011 1.000 . . . . 
SMALL 0.009 -0.053** -0.082*** 0.047** 
-
0.077*** -0.032 -0.031 -0.057*** 1.000 . . . 
AGE 0.118*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 
-
0.062*** 0.110*** 0.033 0.179*** -0.023 -0.019 1.000 . . 
ENDDUMMY 0.089*** 0.044** -0.064*** -0.002 -0.048** 0.010 
-
0.079*** -0.027 0.027 0.037* 1.000 . 
ESGSCORE 0.471*** 0.536*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.087*** -0.029 0.052** -0.158*** -0.032 0.162*** 0.113*** 1.000 
  N= 2049.000                       
  * p<0.10 ,**p<0.05, *** p<0.01                   
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Econometric analysis of Hypothesis 1 (H1)  
 
In response to the first hypothesis H1, firstly we prepared some simple OLS regression 
models, to examine in depth the effect of every variable in our model and then we proceed with 
GLS method which take into consideration the period of 2012 to 2016 estimating Panel Data 
Regression models.  
 
At the beginning, we regress all the control variables of our model, without testing 
(ESGSCORE) and without taking the year and country effect under consideration. The results 
are presented in the aggregated table below (Table 6), in the first column of (LAUDIT). We can 
infer that the model is not significant since the overall R-squared figured at 39.1 percent. 
Despite this fact, it should be mentioned that some variables that put an influence at the level 
of the audit fees are the market capitalization or the size of the firm (LMVE), the (LEV), the 
(ROA) and the (AGE). Among them, the most substantial are the (LMVE) and (LEV) with a 
strong and positive effect at the 1% level of significance. The (AGE) and (ROA) variables, 
notice some significance at 5%, with a positive and negative association, respectively.  
 
Moving forward with the second regression in column (2) (LAUDIT) of Table 6, we use 
again only the control variables, but we include now the Year and Country effects. This changes 
soar the overall R-squared at 61.5 percent, giving substantial power to our model and 
emphasizing again to (LMVE) and (LEV) variables as the most important, with a positive impact 
on audit fees (LAUDIT). Then, (ROA) and (RINV) interpret an influence on audit fees, in a 
negative and positive way, respectively. Interestingly, here the (SMALL) dummy shows some 
importance, even a weak one, as the level of significance is at 10%. What can be derived from 
that table is the fact that companies and years have a strong effect on the model, justifying the 
dramatic increase of R-squared.  
 
In the third (3) (LAUDIT) column, the regression which is examined, includes the 
(ESGSCORE) predictor variable, to test solely if the CSR disclosure score affects the level of 
audit fees. The results are strong and positive giving substance to our model configuration, since 
the coefficient of (ESGSCORE) equals to 0.009 and the t-statistic equals to 4.119 at the 1% 
level of significance.  
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Table 6: PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS- Robustness Tests 
 Pred. 
Sign 
(1) LAUDIT 
b/t 
(2) LAUDIT 
b/t 
(3) 
LAUDIT 
b/t 
(4) 
LAUDIT 
b/t 
Constant  -6.209*** -8.539*** -5.797*** -8.118*** 
  (-9.905) (-12.562) (-9.457) (-12.398) 
LMVE + 0.291*** 0.384*** 0.261*** 0.349*** 
  (10.726) (14.022) (9.695) (13.012) 
NETINCDUMMY - -0.025 -0.030 -0.017 -0.022 
  (-0.710) (-0.800) (-0.495) (-0.586) 
LEV + 0.546*** 0.668*** 0.511*** 0.625*** 
  (2.751) (3.124) (2.710) (3.114) 
ROA - -0.005** -0.007** -0.005** -0.006** 
  (-2.203) (-2.513) (-2.107) (-2.470) 
MTB2 - -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-1.226) (-1.368) (-1.204) (-1.308) 
RINV + 0.144 0.482** 0.135 0.454** 
  (0.594) (2.131) (0.557) (2.032) 
  (WREVGR) + 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.661) (-0.497) (1.039) (-0.006) 
SMALL + 0.075 0.096* 0.077 0.097* 
  (1.618) (1.929) (1.636) (1.912) 
AGE + 0.004** 0.001 0.004* 0.001 
  (2.139) (0.824) (1.820) (0.425) 
ENDDUMMY + 0.128 0.103 0.111 0.069 
  (0.984) (0.962) (0.892) (0.669) 
ESGSCORE +   0.009*** 0.012*** 
    (4.119) (5.876) 
Year Effects  No Yes No Yes 
Country Effects  No Yes No Yes 
r2_w  0.012 0.009 0.016 0.012 
r2_b  0.399 0.598 0.418 0.627 
r2_o  0.391 0.615 0.411 0.644 
N  2.049.000 2.049.000 2.049.000 2.049.000 
I* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Following in the fourth (4) (LAUDIT) column, which presents the whole regression 
model taking into consideration Country and Year effects, the overall R-squared peaked at 64.4 
percent noted a huge difference from the first regression, showing the extreme importance of 
CSR scores to the determination of the audit fees (LAUDIT). Highly positive and substantial 
variables here are seemed to be the (LMVE), the (ESGSCORE) and the (LEV) in 1% level of 
significance.  Examining in the 5% level, (ROA) and (RINV), notice some importance with 
negative and positive association respectively. In continuous, a weak positive association is 
appeared, regarding the (SMALL) dummy variable.  
 
The aforementioned robustness tests can be provided in the pivot table below, (Table 
6), showing aggregated results. These results confirm the association between CSR and Audit 
Fees, supporting the Hypothesis H1 
 
Econometric analysis of Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
 
The table 7, presents the three examined models taking into consideration the three 
levels of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, revealing a weak to strong effect respectively. 
 
The sample examined in the first column of Audit Fees (LAUDIT) in the aggregated 
table above, derives from the group of sixteen countries including France, Switzerland, Norway, 
Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Netherlands, Poland, Belgium, Slovenia and Estonia consistent with Yale’s EPI classification. 
Here, the most significant coefficients are the (LMVE), (LEV) and (ESGSCORE) that strongly 
and positively impact on Audit Fees (LAUDIT), since the t-statistics indicate it in 1% level of 
significance. Also, there are greater than zero and the coefficient interval confirms that they 
don’t include a null number. (see Table 8: group2). Moreover, t-stat. of (ROA) shows a 
significant negative association with the (LAUDIT) at 5% of confidence level and (SMALL) 
dummy appears to be slightly significant at the level of 1%. 
 
In the second column of (LAUDIT) in the aggregated table, a smaller group of 
countries is analyzed enclosing the top-three countries as ranked from Yale research. Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark deemed to be the best countries in CSR adoption offering here a sample 
of 536 observations from 141 firm groups. 
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Table 7: Aggregated Robust Results 
 (1) LAUDIT b/t (2) LAUDIT b/t  (3) LAUDIT b/t 
Constant -6.589*** -4.958*** -6.328*** 
 (-9.195) (-4.500) (-10.115) 
LMVE 0.291*** 0.255*** 0.279*** 
 (9.217) (5.142) (10.135) 
NETINCDUMMY -0.008 -0.005 -0.009 
 (-0.178) (-0.097) (-0.248) 
LEV 0.593*** 0.732* 0.580*** 
 (2.898) (1.921) (3.065) 
ROA -0.006** -0.003 -0.005** 
 (-2.138) (-0.640) (-2.206) 
MTB2 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.947) (-0.621) (-1.225) 
RINV 0.218 -0.027 0.134 
 (0.751) (-0.064) (0.558) 
(WREVGR) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.666) (0.702) (0.974) 
SMALL 0.105* -0.027 0.078* 
 (1.902) (-0.406) (1.647) 
AGE -0.002 0.010** 0.002 
 (-1.108) (2.494) (1.058) 
END DUMMY 0.153 -0.174 0.086 
 (1.186) (-0.502) (0.735) 
ESG SCORE 0.012*** -0.006 0.011*** 
 (5.324) (-1.371) (4.811) 
High==1   0.996*** 
   (4.977) 
(High1)*ESGSCORE   -0.015*** 
   (-2.967) 
r2_w 0.018 0.030 0.019 
r2_b 0.490 0.380 0.450 
r2_o 0.488 0.379 0.446 
N 1.513.000 536.000 2.049.000 
II* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Finland, Sweden and Denmark deemed to be the best countries in CSR adoption offering here 
a sample of 536 observations from 141 firm groups. The most statistically significant coefficient 
is the (LMVE) at the level of 1%, with a positive association. At the level of 5% (AGE) appear 
to be positively significant and (LEV) has a weak positive effect on 10% level. Surprisingly, 
(ESGSCORE) does not seem to be an important predictor variable, since the t-stat. equals -
1.371. In the separate control of this model, the p-value of (ESGSCORE)  p-value equals 0.172 
exceeding the level of 0.05 and zero is included in the 95% of coefficient interval (see table 20 
appendix) Despite this, the coefficient of (ESGSCORE) is a negative number which assumes an 
inverse relationship with (LAUDIT). So, the most obvious finding to emerge from the above 
table is that in countries with highly developed CSR concept over the years, the ESG disclosure 
score seems to decline the level of audit fees, contrary to our previous results.  
 
A possible explanation for this might be that the auditors spend less time and effort in 
reviewing reports from countries with prominent CSR perceptions. That may lie in the deeper 
understanding of the CSR concept that these companies have obtained through the years, 
reflecting it in their reports and in evaluation scores from third parties. Besides, that companies 
may underpin more transparent reports since they have adopted CSR policies not for marketing 
and competitive reasons, but for an ethical obligation that every organization has on the 
environment that operates. This is the core concept of CSR, sustainability accounting, and 
accountability, as well. Supporting this statement J. Bebbington et al. (2014) suggested that for 
a long-term corporate growth and sustainability, firms have to act with respect to the society 
and environment. Moreover, these countries may be more concern about the legitimacy theory 
and have signed a strong social contract by establishing CSR in their institutional tradition. 
Here, it should be mentioned that companies from the Northern Europe have increased 
sensitivity for societal issues and they act in favor of them by establishing a relative framework 
to boost CSR activities. For example, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, as it is explained in depth 
before, have engendered mandatory regulations based on GRI requirements.  
 
From the data in the third column of the Table, it is apparent that the whole sample is 
examined, taken together all the nineteen countries and regress the full model. It can be clearly 
observed that the strongest and statistically significant variables at the level of 1%, are the 
(LMVE), (LEV), (ESGSCORE), (High1) with a positive influence on audit pricing (LAUDIT). 
Interestingly, (High1*ESG) variable noted a very strong and negative effect on audit fees. In 
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addition, at the level of 5%, (ROA) negatively affect the audit fees and at 10% (SMALL) variable 
notes a weak positive association with the output variable (LAUDIT).  
 
Together these results provide important insights into our approach to the Hypothesis 
H2. First of all, (High1) shows the difference in audit fees from companies of High countries 
that suggest, that countries without a structured framework in CSR area pay higher audit fees. 
 
Secondly, the (ESGSCORE) consistent with the results of the first hypothesis H1, has a 
positive effect on audit fees and thirdly, and more important, (High1*ESG) indicates the extra 
effect of ESG score on audit fees for companies originated in High countries, as we form the 
groups previously. This extra effect seems to have a strong and negative association with the 
determination of audit fees. Meaning that the High companies will pay fewer salaries in auditing 
than the other companies with lower CSR development. Thus, reveals that auditors charge less 
fees to sensible and top in CSR companies, potentially due to the increased trust for more 
transparent reports. These findings provide extra support to the hypothesis H2.  
 
Discussion and Justification of Results 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, the effect of CSR on Audit Fees is a newly 
introduced field for research with controversial results. With respect to the first research 
question, it was found that adoption of CSR policies drive the audit fees in higher levels since 
the ESG disclosure score is strongly and positively correlated with Audit fees. Another 
important finding was that in countries with highly developed legislation concerning the non-
financial reporting, was identified a strong and negative relationship between CSR and Audit 
Fees. These contradictory findings suggest that mandatory disclosure of CSR policies is 
detected to be a substantial and beneficial factor in auditing procedure. Mandatory disclosure 
eliminates the differences in accounting policies, offering more transparent reports and thus 
reducing the information asymmetry and the noise.  
 
Both these results, confirm the association between CSR and Audit Fees, being unable 
to demonstrate the findings of Chen et al., 2011 that showed an inverse relationship, but 
collaborating the statements of Kim D. Y and Kim J. 2013, that claimed the opposite. These 
antithetical outcomes may be due to the absence in the literature and to the newly issued concept 
of CSR implementation and sustainability reporting in the corporate landscape.  
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There are, however, other possible explanations, like the general fact that the size of the 
companies positively affects the level of audit fees, since the audit work is soaring and much 
more accounts have to be examined. Hence, in the line with Chen et al. 2016, the positive 
relation between CSR reposting and audit fees may be due to the additional audit effort that is 
required for providing external assurance. Also, Sun et al. 2010, proved that the firm size is 
positively related to corporate environmental disclosure that makes sensible our results from 
the hypothesis H1, since our sample includes companies with high market capitalization. 
 
Another possible explanation may be lies in the fact that the auditors’ role, despite the 
strict and independent aspect of supervising, discharge consultant services, as well. Considering 
that Corporate Social Responsibility is an extremely developed idea, auditors should find ways 
to recommend the adoption and enhance the extension of such activities. Consequently, their 
duties will be increased, and similarly, their fees are expected to do so.  
 
On the other hand, hypothesis H2, reveals that companies with already remarkably 
developed CSR policies impact on Audit fees in a negative way. This inverse relationship can 
be attributed to the common accounting framework that in general Scandinavian counties 
maintain based on their inclination on mandatory disclosure. In extent, it is observed that well-
regulated and organized framework that force companies to disclose all their information, 
financial or not, offers amenities in auditing procedure and reduces their fees, as well. Thus, 
mandatory regulation in CSR reporting implies lower level of audit fees.  
 
The inconsistency in the literature’s findings may be related to the deficient knowledge 
in the field of sustainable accounting. Gray in 2000, identified the central issue of CSR 
reporting, highlighting the need for a common terminology, the weak attestation practices in 
auditing and the limited professional accounting and auditing education in societal issues. So, 
this fact can support the contrast to our results, supposing that mandatory framework offers 
further guidance in auditing. 
 
Our findings may be somewhat limited by the ESG disclosure score that was used for 
evaluating the CSR adoption of countries and the relevant research of Yale University in 
agreement with previous researchers that reveals the Scandinavian competitive advantage. The 
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results of this research cannot be extrapolated to all countries across the world, as different 
legislations exist with different traditions in accounting policies.  
 
Mandatory legislation in Europe entails improvements since the vast majority of 
countries have not established it yet and those who have, enables companies to offer a poor 
non-financial reporting. It is possible to hypothesize that these conditions of obligatory 
reporting are less likely to occur in small and not listed firms, even in the same country. This 
observation further suggests the necessity of a commonly established framework all over the 
Europe and the world.  
 
Further research should be undertaken to investigate the relation among CSR, Audit 
fees, considering audit complexity from the auditors’ aspect and tendency to fraud and green-
washing for the companies’ perspective.  
Conclusions 
The aim of the present research is to examine the impact of corporate social 
responsibility on audit fees. We intensified our principal research by questioned the 
consequence of CSR performance on audit fees for countries where CSR is highly considered, 
as a second aim of this study. 
 
 Further analyses have indicated how the existence of developed sustainability 
framework affects audit fees. This study shows that the level of audit fees is soaring as the ESG 
disclosure score is increased. We argue that the extra investigation on CSR field, provides 
sustainability assurance, increases the audit work and the required effort. In respect to our 
second purpose, we identify that high CSR performance decrease audit fees, as auditors decline 
the audit effort for firms with heavily regulated CSR reports. The results of this investigation 
show that greater transparency is accomplished through legal frameworks and regulations, thus 
more regulated reports decrease the audit risk. Taken together these findings, suggest a strong 
relation between CSR and Audit Fees that varies from different examined samples, due to the 
differences in legislation. 
 
The outcomes of this thesis provide a new understanding of the above association, 
focusing on the importance of the sustainability reporting. The reporting framework could 
stimulate firms to be more sensitive to social, environmental and governance issues. Moreover, 
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the effect of the existing sustainability reporting standards for counties with significant 
developed CSR concept on audit fees reveals to be negative. Our findings are robust due to the 
multiple regression analysis and tests that have been prepared and completed. We suggest that 
environmental social and governance disclosure regulation enhance company’s value without 
being a costly typical procedure on the part of firms. In contrary with findings in first 
hypothesis, second hypothesis highlight the beneficial role of CSR activities  and the positive 
contribution  to corporations that results in lower audit fees and is consistent with prior research 
which examines the effect of CSR on auditing field.  Chen et al. (2016) argue that auditors 
charge lower fees with regard to CSR performance. According to this frame CSR engagement 
appears to be meaningful for auditors and contributes to audit complexity reduction. More 
significantly our findings point out that nonfinancial reporting supervision influences firms 
variously across countries.  
 
Notwithstanding these regional limitations, the above arguments lead to our prediction 
that social environmental and governance disclosure regulation affects audit fees, since auditors 
will employ less complex audit process for clients with higher CSR performance. Given that, 
sustainability reporting is not mandated worldwide. Our findings indicate that the more 
regulated, the more credible is the disclosure, according to the research of Ioannou 
and Serafeim  (2017). With these results, we contribute and expand the literature that 
investigates the implications of CSR adoption and the beneficial role of the nonfinancial 
information disclosure by the firms (Simnett et al. 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 
2014). Besides, we broaden the research field regarding the regulative frameworks that 
influence social, environmental performance and more generally the overall performance of 
corporations (Konar and Cohen 1997; Scorse and Schlenker 2012).  In our research, we go a 
step further and we seek to provide the impact of sustainability disclosure regulation on audit 
fees. 
 
Our results of this further analysis are important and substantive to regulators and 
corporations who are indented to absorb or even mandate sustainability reporting within their 
context when for time sustainability reporting have a gradual development globally. More 
broadly, research is also needed to determine thresholds and common accounting standards 
toward the facilitation of the audit procedure in order to examine if firms with high CSR scores 
are ethically indeed. To sum up, what is now needed is a cross-national study involving big and 
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small firms, investigating their CSR approaches in conjunction with audit opinion and audit 
fees. 
 
Limitations- Future Research 
 
The main limitation of our study is that the sample used insisted on large listed 
companies only. This is a limitation on CSR research area in general, due to the fact that smaller 
companies and especially unlisted, are not mandated to disclose their CSR performance and 
probably such firms have not even developed such policies. Nevertheless, future studies could 
examine smaller and/or unlisted firms. In that case, may the results reveal the emergent need of 
CSR disclosure legal and mandatory establishment.  
 
Another limitation of our research is the fact that we used the ESG disclosure score in 
order to measure companies’ CSR performance. Our measurement of CSR (Bloomberg ESG 
Disclosure score) not cover all the aspects of CSR as it is defined and may not represent a clear 
indicator of CSR performance and  to some extent may confuse our findings. Other research 
papers, have taken into consideration other ratings and indexes, such as KLD rating (for 
example used by Ioannou and Serafeim 2015, and Chen et. al.2011), DJIA- Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (Malhotra et. al., 2015) and KEJI3 index (consistent with review of Kim D. 
Y and Kim J. 2013). That fact unveils the problem of inconsistency that exists among firms, 
due to the different type of their applications. (Hopkins, 2005). 
 
 Moreover, the study of Hopkins (2005) analyzed the data systems of FTSE4good, Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), Business Ethics 100, AccountAbility (AA) Rating, and 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that have created indices in the attempt of CSR disclosure. 
The paucity of consistent indices and disaggregated level, does not allow extensive control and 
leads to poor monitoring and evaluation systems (Hopkins, 2005). Despite the lack of a common 
mandatory framework; inadequate reporting and consequently incomplete audit may also be 
caused by the partial adoption of CSR concept from the companies. Many firms perceive CSR 
as something that can increase their reputation and offer extra corporate value, without 
understanding the core idea of CSR. That is the reason why many companies can disclose some 
information and present good records and finally be blamed for manipulation and 
greenwashing, like Enron, Shell, Worldcom and Palmalat.  
39 
 
 
Our research is held in nineteen countries. Taken together our results the Scandinavian 
countries seem to perform exceptionally on social environmental and governance through the 
structured regulation which results in lower audit fees, while on average the rest of our countries 
lack of regulatory framework and present significant effects on the manner that auditors detect 
CSR performance. This is a major restriction for our research, too.  Moreover, our study is 
unable to identify the relationship between a possible change of existing  ESG disclosure 
regulation and firms response, hence there is space for future research. 
 
These findings suggest several courses of action for deeper CSR understanding, 
engagement, and wider disclosure of non-financial information by the company’s side. 
 
Penetrating into the real concept of CSR, companies, and countries will operate in an 
ethical way, with respect to the wider environment (people, earth), ensuring their long-term 
sustainability (consistent with Bebbigtone et al. 2014). All in all, to enhance CSR activities we 
appreciate that there is a need for the establishment of an overall index, mandatory sustainability 
reporting, better accounting education and audit training that could enable a thorough audit, as 
well.   
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Appendix 
Table 8: Descriptive stat 
EXCHANGE Freq. Percent Cum. 
HK 3 0.08 0.08 
SP 5 0.14 0.22 
SK 13 0.36 0.59 
LX 5 0.14 0.73 
LH 5 0.14 0.86 
SV 15 0.42 1.28 
AU 5 0.14 1.42 
ET 21 0.59 2.01 
LR 7 0.20 2.20 
IM 14 0.39 2.59 
CN 8 0.22 2.82 
LN 69 1.92 4.74 
CP 26 0.73 5.47 
PW 132 3.68 9.15 
SW 220 6.14 15.29 
DC 173 4.83 20.11 
ID 47 1.31 21.42 
FH 219 6.11 27.53 
AV 114 3.18 30.71 
NO 274 7.64 38.35 
US 162 4.52 42.87 
FP 614 17.13 60.00 
BB 134 3.74 63.74 
VX 145 4.04 67.78 
GR 561 15.65 83.43 
NA 186 5.19 88.62 
SS 408 11.38 100.00 
Total 3,585 100.00  
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Table 9: Yale research, EPI score 
Country 2016 EPI Score 
Finland 90.68 
Sweden 90.43 
Denmark 89.21 
Slovenia 88.98 
Estonia 88.59 
France 88.20 
Switzerland 86.93 
Norway 86.90 
Austria 86.64 
Ireland 86.60 
Luxembourg 86.58 
Latvia 85.71 
Lithuania 85.49 
Slovakia 85.42 
Czech Republic 84.67 
Germany 84.26 
Netherlands 82.03 
Poland 81.26 
Belgium 80.15 
 
Table 10: OLS regression, robustness tests with control variables  
Number of obs  =    2049 
F( 10,  2038)  =  161.96 
Prob > F =  0.0000 
R-squared =  0.3993 
Root MSE =  1.2311 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust.St. Er. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .5963182 .0169916 35.09 0.000 .5629955 .6296409 
NETINCDUMMY -.063028 .0925974 -0.68 0.496 -.2446233 .1185673 
LEV .9924277 .1703134 5.83 0.000 .6584211 1.326.434 
ROA -.0118206 .0037984 -3.11 0.002 -.0192697 -.0043716 
MTB2 -.0076962 .003596 -2.14 0.032 -.0147485 -.0006439 
RINV .355891 .2089689 1.70 0.089 -.0539239 .7657059 
WREVGR -.0021835 .002208 -0.99 0.323 -.0065136 .0021466 
SMALL .2318559 .1605111 1.44 0.149 -.0829271 .546639 
AGE .0046983 .0009913 4.74 0.000 .0027542 .0066424 
ENDDUMMY .2986967 .0787586 3.79 0.000 .144241 .4531524 
_cons -1.309.953 .368442 -35.55 0.000 -138.221 -1.237.697 
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Table 11: OLS regression corrected for unwanted correlation for country 2  
Number of obs  =    2049 
F( 10,    16)  =  396.05 
Prob > F       =  0.0000 
R-squared      =  0.3993 
Root MSE =  1.2311 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 17 clusters in Country) 
 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
t P>t [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
LMVE .5963182 .0578277 10.31 0.000 .473729 .7189074 
NETINCDUMMY -.063028 .1121588 -0.56 0.582 -.300794 .174738 
LEV .9924277 .2044461 4.85 0.000 .5590214 1.425.834 
ROA -.0118206 .0072842 -1.62 0.124 -.0272625 .0036212 
MTB2 -.0076962 .0040808 -1.89 0.078 -.0163471 .0009548 
RINV .355891 .3789573 0.94 0.362 -.4474626 1.159.245 
WREVGR -.0021835 .0053203 -0.41 0.687 -.0134619 .0090949 
SMALL .2318559 .1908449 1.21 0.242 -.1727171 .636429 
AGE .0046983 .0046891 1.00 0.331 -.0052421 .0146387 
ENDDUMMY .2986967 .2216779 1.35 0.197 -.1712395 .7686329 
_cons -1.309.953 1.156.868 -11.32 0.000 -1.555.198 -1.064.708 
 
Table 12: OLS regression corrected for unwanted correlation for firm  
Number of obs. = 2049  
F( 10,570) = 45.75  
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squar ed = 0.3993 
Root MSE = 1.2311 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM)  
LAUDIT Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .5963182 .0316591 18.84 0.000 .5341354 .6585009 
NETINCDUMMY -.063028 .1156223 -0.55 0.586 -.2901257 .1640697 
LEV .9924277 .335677 2.96 0.003 .3331129 1.651.743 
ROA -.0118206 .0054721 -2.16 0.031 -.0225686 -.0010727 
MTB2 -.0076962 .0049443 -1.56 0.120 -.0174075 .0020152 
RINV .355891 .384524 0.93 0.355 -.3993658 1.111.148 
WREVGR -.0021835 .0025733 -0.85 0.397 -.0072378 .0028708 
SMALL .2318559 .1786697 1.30 0.195 -.1190754 .5827873 
AGE .0046983 .00198 2.37 0.018 .0008093 .0085873 
ENDDUMMY .2986967 .1575924 1.90 0.059 -.0108359 .6082293 
_cons -1.309.953 .6847032 -19.13 0.000 -1.444.438 -1.175.469 
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Table 13: OLS regressions Country effects 
Number of obs  = 2049  
F( 24,   570)  =       .  
Prob > F  =       .  
R-squared  = 0.6645 
Root MSE  = .92368 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM)  
LAUDIT Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .6567937 .0263701 24.91 0.000 .6049993 .7085881 
NETINCDUMMY .0274854 .1011617 0.27 0.786 -.1712097 .2261806 
LEV 1.015.137 .3449356 2.94 0.003 .3376375 1.692.637 
ROA -.0193718 .0056172 -3.45 0.001 -.0304047 -.0083389 
MTB2 -.0112145 .0056418 -1.99 0.047 -.0222958 -.0001332 
RINV 1.152.961 .2917632 3.95 0.000 .5798994 1.726.024 
WREVGR -.0093696 .0020693 -4.53 0.000 -.0134339 -.0053052 
SMALL .4575914 .1413537 3.24 0.001 .1799538 .7352291 
AGE -.0003513 .001328 -0.26 0.791 -.0029597 .002257 
ENDDUMMY .1498891 .1146541 1.31 0.192 -.075307 .3750852 
Country_D1 .0782473 .1736717 0.45 0.652 -.2628673 .4193618 
Country_D2 .7871134 .2529208 3.11 0.002 .2903429 1.283.884 
Country_D3 325.538 .5952651 5.47 0.000 2.086.199 442.456 
Country_D4 2.081.231 .1916263 10.86 0.000 1.704.851 245.761 
Country_D5 0 (omitted)     
Country_D6 .5780839 .1612838 3.58 0.000 .2613008 .894867 
Country_D7 1.736.801 .1158314 14.99 0.000 1.509.292 1.964.309 
Country_D8 .7980072 .1121477 7.12 0.000 .5777339 101.828 
Country_D9 .9511737 .2268441 4.19 0.000 .5056214 1.396.726 
Country_D10 -1.404.644 .0695368 -20.20 0.000 -1.541.224 -1.268.064 
Country_D11 0 (omitted)     
Country_D12 1.462.102 .2555645 5.72 0.000 .9601391 1.964.065 
Country_D13 1.314.867 .160776 8.18 0.000 .9990809 1.630.652 
Country_D14 2.365.447 .1899713 12.45 0.000 1.992.318 2.738.576 
Country_D15 .8036574 .2847688 2.82 0.005 .2443332 1.362.982 
Country_D16 0 (omitted)     
Country_D17 -.0556278 .2371016 -0.23 0.815 -.5213273 .4100718 
Country_D18 3.105.178 .1361885 22.80 0.000 2.837.685 3.372.671 
Country_D19 1.175.203 .1701148 6.91 0.000 .8410748 1.509.332 
_cons -1.585.831 .4977476 -31.86 0.000 -1.683.595 -1.488.066 
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Table 14:OLS regression country and year effects  
Number of obs =2049  
F( 29,   570) =       .  
Prob > F =       . 
R-squared =  0.6659 
Root MSE = .92263 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM)  
LAUDIT Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .660829 .026542 24.90 0.000 .608697 .712961 
NETINCDUMMY .0271519 .1008875 0.27 0.788 -.1710048 .2253086 
LEV 1.008.653 .3430977 2.94 0.003 .3347634 1.682.544 
ROA -.0193629 .0055945 -3.46 0.001 -.0303513 -.0083745 
MTB2 -.0109548 .0055756 -1.96 0.050 -.021906 -3.58e-06 
RINV 1.144.104 .2920013 3.92 0.000 .5705742 1.717.634 
WREVGR -.0094776 .0021109 -4.49 0.000 -.0136236 -.0053315 
SMALL .4530705 .1412619 3.21 0.001 .1756131 .7305279 
AGE -.0004514 .0013295 -0.34 0.734 -.0030628 .00216 
ENDDUMMY .1487836 .1149066 1.29 0.196 -.0769084 .3744756 
Country_D1 .0499106 .1750887 0.29 0.776 -.2939873 .3938084 
Country_D2 .7654273 .2539652 3.01 0.003 .2666054 1.264.249 
Country_D3 3.263.595 .6060053 5.39 0.000 2.073.319 4.453.871 
Country_D4 2.051.585 .1936506 10.59 0.000 167.123 2.431.941 
Country_D5 0 (omitted)     
Country_D6 .5506202 .1620167 3.40 0.001 .2323976 .8688428 
Country_D7 1.700.915 .1175109 14.47 0.000 1.470.108 1.931.722 
Country_D8 .7649171 .1134003 6.75 0.000 .5421836 .9876505 
Country_D9 .9150547 .2300351 3.98 0.000 .4632348 1.366.875 
Country_D10 -1.394.707 .0710524 -19.63 0.000 -1.534.264 -125.515 
Country_D11 0 (omitted)     
Country_D12 1.428.333 .2535832 5.63 0.000 .9302613 1.926.404 
Country_D13 1.284.856 .1608761 7.99 0.000 .9688737 1.600.838 
Country_D14 2.337.305 .1910336 12.24 0.000 1.962.089 2.712.521 
Country_D15 .7916586 .2856994 2.77 0.006 .2305066 1.352.811 
Country_D16 0 (omitted)     
Country_D17 -.0795587 .2372428 -0.34 0.737 -.5455356 .3864181 
Country_D18 3.077.455 .1380074 22.30 0.000 280.639 334.852 
Country_D19 1.153 .1724083 6.69 0.000 .8143667 1.491.633 
Year_D1 .1931015 .0542929 3.56 0.000 .086463 .2997401 
Year_D2 .0830354 .0481382 1.72 0.085 -.0115145 .1775854 
Year_D3 .102625 .0457402 2.24 0.025 .012785 .192465 
Year_D4 .0387779 .0399572 0.97 0.332 -.0397034 .1172593 
Year_D5 0 (omitted)     
_cons -1.598.265 .5067391 -31.54 0.000 -1.697.796 -1.498.735 
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Table 15: OLS regression full model 
Number of obs  =    2049 
F( 29,   570)  =       . 
Prob > F        =       .  
R-squared   =0.6815 
Root MSE   =  .90113 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM) 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust  
Std. Err. 
t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .5667095 .0278397 20.36 0.000 .5120286 .6213904 
NETINCDUMMY .0310101 .0970388 0.32 0.749 -.1595872 .2216074 
LEV .92212 .3097685 2.98 0.003 .313693 1.530.547 
ROA -.0177523 .0051691 -3.43 0.001 -.0279051 -.0075994 
MTB2 -.009463 .0049102 -1.93 0.054 -.0191074 .0001814 
RINV .9905356 .2809699 3.53 0.000 .4386729 1.542.398 
WREVGR -.0067538 .0020089 -3.36 0.001 -.0106995 -.002808 
SMALL .4652771 .1481777 3.14 0.002 .1742362 .756318 
AGE -.0010482 .0013213 -0.79 0.428 -.0036433 .001547 
ENDDUMMY .0947902 .1072498 0.88 0.377 -.1158628 .3054432 
Country_D1 .0021782 .1631723 0.01 0.989 -.318314 .3226705 
Country_D2 .8093884 .22797 3.55 0.000 .3616246 1.257.152 
Country_D3 3.575.304 .618657 5.78 0.000 2.360.178 4.790.429 
Country_D4 2.085.557 .1948253 10.70 0.000 1.702.894 2.468.221 
Country_D5 0 (omitted)     
Country_D6 .3917757 .1612908 2.43 0.015 .0749789 .7085726 
Country_D7 1.626.872 .1104612 14.73 0.000 1.409.912 1.843.833 
Country_D8 .8691606 .1125144 7.72 0.000 .6481672 1.090.154 
Country_D9 1.048.503 .2113438 4.96 0.000 .6333956 1.463.611 
Country_D10 -1.052.732 .0822544 -12.80 0.000 -1.214.291 -.8911732 
Country_D11 0 (omitted)     
Country_D12 1.603.844 .2310089 6.94 0.000 1.150.112 2.057.577 
Country_D13 1.361.985 .1620997 8.40 0.000 10.436 1.680.371 
Country_D14 2.392.163 .1828233 13.08 0.000 2.033.073 2.751.252 
Country_D15 .9256979 .271784 3.41 0.001 .3918776 1.459.518 
Country_D16 0 (omitted)     
Country_D17 -.2249995 .1674797 -1.34 0.180 -.5539521 .1039531 
Country_D18 3.053.996 .1313556 23.25 0.000 2.795.996 3.311.996 
Country_D19 1.202.741 .1677704 7.17 0.000 .8732175 1.532.265 
Year_D1 .2406778 .0531624 4.53 0.000 .1362598 .3450958 
Year_D2 .1186006 .0471475 2.52 0.012 .0259965 .2112047 
Year_D3 .1010288 .0452441 2.23 0.026 .0121633 .1898944 
Year_D4 .0442264 .0390059 1.13 0.257 -.0323864 .1208392 
Year_D5 0 (omitted)     
ESGSCORE .0167087 .0027383 6.10 0.000 .0113304 .022087 
_cons -1.442.182 .5260397 -27.42 0.000 -1.545.504 -1.338.861 
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Table 16: PANEL DATA robust regression with control variables 
Random-effects GLS regression                       Number of obs  = 2049 
Group variable: FIRM                                         Number of groups = 571 
R-sq:   within  = 0.0117                                      Obs per group: min  = 1 
between = 0.3993                                                            avg  = 3.6 
overall = 0.3915                                                             max   = 5 
Wald chi2(10)  = 138.12 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                                 Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM) 
 
 
In the above table, (ROA) appeared as the most important variable, since the z-score, the p-
value and the coefficient interval indicate it (z-score= -2.20 < 1.96, p-value= 0.028< 0.05 and 
coef. inter. does not include zero values). That result can suggest that more profitable companies 
pay lower audit fees, since there is a strong negative relation between the output variable of 
(LAUDIT) and predictor variable of (ROA). 
 
 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z                  P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
LMVE .2911694 .0271464 10.73          0.000 .2379634 .3443753 
NETINC
DUMMY 
-.0248487 .0350151 -0.71    0.478 -.093477 .0437797 
LEV .5464636 .1986625 2.75    0.006 .1570922 .935835 
ROA -.0049885 .002264 -2.20    0.028 -.0094258 -.0005511 
MTB2 -.0015644 .001276 -1.23    0.220 -.0040653 .0009364 
RINV .1444135 .2429663 0.59    0.552 -.3317917 .6206188 
WREVG
R 
.0006452 .0009754 0.66    0.508 -.0012665 .0025568 
SMALL .075152 .0464356 1.62    0.106 -.0158601 .166164 
AGE .0044207 .0020664 2.14    0.032 .0003705 .0084709 
ENDDU
MMY 
.1278027 .1298409 0.98    0.325 -.1266808 .3822862 
_cons -6.209.029 .62687 -9.90    0.000 -7.437.672 -4.980.387 
sigma_u 12.065.29
6 
     
sigma_e .32170548      
rho .93362373 (fraction of variance 
due 
to u_i)  
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Table 17: PANEL DATA robust regression county, year effects 
Random-effects GLS regression                     Number of obs   = 2049   
Group variable: FIRM                                      Number of groups   = 571  
R-sq:  within  = 0.0122                               Obs per group:  min = 1  
between  = 0.6265                                          avg  = .6  
overall   = 0.6441                                           max  = 5  
                                                     Wald chi2(30) =         .  
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)                     Prob > chi2  =         .   
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM) 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z     P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interva
l] 
LMVE .349165
6 
.0268351 13.01    0.00
0 
.2965698 .401761
4 
NETINCDUM
MY 
-
.021878
2 
.0373666 -0.59    0.55
8 
-.0951154 .051359 
LEV .625429 .2008139 3.11    0.00
2 
.2318411 101901
7 
ROA -
.006209
7 
.0025143 -2.47    0.01
4 
-.0111377 -
.001281
8 
MTB2 -
.001834
9 
.0014034 -1.31    0.19
1 
-.0045854 .000915
6 
RINV .454315
2 
.2235402 2.03    0.04
2 
.0161844 .892446 
WREVGR -6.24e-
06 
.0009615 -0.01    0.99
5 
-.0018907 .001878
2 
SMALL .097308
2 
.0508831 1.91    0.05
6 
-.0024207 .197037
2 
AGE .000666
8 
.0015673 0.43    0.67
0 
-.0024049 .003738
6 
ENDDUMMY .069136
6 
.1033298 0.67    0.50
3 
-.133386 .271659
2 
Country_D1 -
1341644 
.267392 -5.02    0.00
0 
-1865723 -
.817565
8 
Country_D2 -
.462962
5 
.2780453 -1.67    0.09
6 
-1007921 .081996
2 
Country_D3 1871137 .9146142 2.05    0.04
1 
.0785261 366374
8 
Country_D4 .627573
4 
.291019 2.16    0.03
1 
.0571867 119796 
Country_D5 0 (omitted)     
Country_D6 -
.810231
7 
.2385211 -3.40    0.00
1 
-1277724 -
.342739 
Country_D7 .610127
1 
.2088292 2.92    0.00
3 
.2008294 101942
5 
Country_D8 -
.143077
8 
.211046 -0.68    0.49
8 
-.5567202 .270564
7 
Country_D9 -
.099954
1 
.3073042 -0.33    0.74
5 
-.7022593 .502351 
Country_D10 -
2732788 
.2295209 -11.91    0.00
0 
-3182641 -
228293
5 
Country_D11 0 (omitted)     
Country_D12 .494503 .3345797 1.48    0.13
9 
-.1612612 115026
7 
Country_D13 .266901
8 
.2496985 1.07    0.28
5 
-.2224983 .756301
9 
Country_D14 .905342
8 
.2679778 3.38    0.00
1 
.380116 143057 
Country_D15 -
.134491
6 
.4160801 -0.32    0.74
7 
-.9499937 .681010
4 
Country_D16 -
1325572 
.2087838 -6.35    0.00
0 
-1734781 -
.916363
7 
Country_D17 -
1395238 
.3110006 -4.49    0.00
0 
-2004788 -
.785688
2 
Country_D18 1708039 .2181163 7.83    0.00
0 
1280539 213553
9 
Country_D19 0 (omitted)     
Year_D1 .096429
4 
.0357682 2.70    0.00
7 
.026325 .166533
9 
Year_D2 .022772
3 
.0302073 0.75    0.45
1 
-.0364328 .081977
5 
Year_D3 .011255
6 
.0247415 0.45    0.64
9 
-.0372368 .059748 
Year_D4 .000955
2 
.0216108 0.04    0.96
5 
-.0414013 .043311
6 
Year_D5 0 (omitted)     
ESGSCORE .011967 .0020364 5.88    0.00
0 
.0079756 .015958
3 
_cons -
8118239 
.654805 -12.40    0.00
0 
-9401633 -
683484
5 
sigma_u .881815
63 
     
sigma_e .320686
87 
     
rho .883194
54 
(fraction of variance 
due to 
 u_i)  
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Table 18: PANEL DATA robust regression country, 4-Years effects 
Random-effects GLS regression                     Number of obs  = 2049  
Group variable: FIRM                                    Number of groups = 571  
R-sq:  within  = 0.0122                                   Obs per group:  min = 1  
       between  = 0.6265                                                              avg = 3.6  
       overall = 0.6441                                                                   max = 5  
                                                                                    Wald chi2(30) =         .  
corr(u_i, X)  = 0 (assumed)                                        Prob > chi2 =         .  
      (Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM) 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z     P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval
] 
LMVE .349165
6 
.0268351 13.01    0.00
0 
.2965698 .401761
4 
NETINCDUM
MY 
-
.021878
2 
.0373666 -0.59    0.55
8 
-.0951154 .051359 
LEV .625429 .2008139 3.11    0.00
2 
.2318411 1.019.01
7 
ROA -
.006209
7 
.0025143 -2.47    0.01
4 
-.0111377 -
.001281
8 
MTB2 -
.001834
9 
.0014034 -1.31    0.19
1 
-.0045854 .000915
6 
RINV .454315
2 
.2235402 2.03    0.04
2 
.0161844 .892446 
WREVGR -6.24e-
06 
.0009615 -0.01    0.99
5 
-.0018907 .001878
2 
SMALL .097308
2 
.0508831 1.91    0.05
6 
-.0024207 .197037
2 
AGE .000666
8 
.0015673 0.43    0.67
0 
-.0024049 .003738
6 
ENDDUMMY .069136
6 
.1033298 0.67    0.50
3 
-.133386 .271659
2 
Country_D1 -
1.341.64
4 
.267392 -5.02    0.00
0 
-
1.865.723 
-
.817565
8 
Country_D2 -
.462962
5 
.2780453 -1.67    0.09
6 
-
1.007.921 
.081996
2 
Country_D3 1.871.13
7 
.9146142 2.05    0.04
1 
.0785261 3.663.74
8 
Country_D4 .627573
4 
.291019 2.16    0.03
1 
.0571867 119.796 
Country_D5 0 (omitted)     
Country_D6 -
.810231
7 
.2385211 -3.40    0.00
1 
-
1.277.724 
-.342739 
Country_D7 .610127
1 
.2088292 2.92    0.00
3 
.2008294 1.019.42
5 
Country_D8 -
.143077
8 
.211046 -0.68    0.49
8 
-.5567202 .270564
7 
Country_D9 -
.099954
1 
.3073042 -0.33    0.74
5 
-.7022593 .502351 
Country_D10 -
2.732.78
8 
.2295209 -11.91    0.00
0 
-
3.182.641 
-
2.282.93
5 
Country_D11 0 (omitted)     
Country_D12 .494503 .3345797 1.48    0.13
9 
-.1612612 1.150.26
7 
Country_D13 .266901
8 
.2496985 1.07    0.28
5 
-.2224983 .756301
9 
Country_D14 .905342
8 
.2679778 3.38    0.00
1 
.380116 143.057 
Country_D15 -
.134491
6 
.4160801 -0.32    0.74
7 
-.9499937 .681010
4 
Country_D16 -
1.325.57
2 
.2087838 -6.35    0.00
0 
-
1.734.781 
-
.916363
7 
Country_D17 -
1.395.23
8 
.3110006 -4.49    0.00
0 
-
2.004.788 
-
.785688
2 
Country_D18 1.708.03
9 
.2181163 7.83    0.00
0 
1.280.539 2.135.53
9 
Country_D19 0 (omitted)     
Year_D2 -
.073657
1 
.0287038 -2.57    0.01
0 
-.1299155 -
.017398
7 
Year_D3 -
.085173
9 
.0322183 -2.64    0.00
8 
-.1483207 -
.022027
1 
Year_D4 -
.095474
3 
.0339552 -2.81    0.00
5 
-.1620252 -
.028923
3 
Year_D5 -
.096429
4 
.0357682 -2.70    0.00
7 
-.1665339 -.026325 
ESGSCORE .011967 .0020364 5.88    0.00
0 
.0079756 .015958
3 
_cons -802.181 .6468717 -12.40    0.00
0 
-
9.289.655 
-
6.753.96
4 
sigma_u .881815
63 
     
sigma_e .320686
87 
     
rho .883194
54 
(fraction of variance 
due 
to u_i)  
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Table 19: PANEL DATA regression for sixteen countries 
Random-effects GLS regression                     Number of obs  = 1513  
Group variable: FIRM                                      Number of groups = 430  
R-sq:  within = 0.0175                            Obs per group: min  = 1  
Between  = 0.4862                                           avg   = 3.5  
 Overall  = 0.4859                                           max   = 5  
                                                    Wald chi2(10)  = 174.49 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)                       Prob > chi2  = 0.0000 
 
                                         (Std. Error adjusted for 430 clusters in FIRM) 
 
LAUDIT Coef. Std. Err. z     P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .2877856 .0315677 9.12    0.000 .2259139 .3496572 
LEV .5715472 .2076373 2.75    0.006 .1645855 .9785089 
ROA -.0058801 .0027588 -2.13    0.033 -.0112874 -.0004729 
MTB2 -.0026638 .0028205 -0.94    0.345 -.0081918 .0028642 
RINV .2096793 .2891441 0.73    0.468 -.3570326 .7763913 
WREVGR .0007349 .0011052 0.66    0.506 -.0014313 .0029011 
AGE -.0021401 .0019239 -1.11    0.266 -.0059109 .0016307 
ENDDUMMY .1522944 .1293837 1.18    0.239 -.101293 .4058818 
NETINCDUMMY -.0074407 .0435334 -0.17    0.864 -.0927646 .0778832 
ESGSCORE .012064 .0022853 5.28    0.000 .0075848 .0165431 
_cons -6.501.361 .7175722 -9.06    0.000 -7.907.777 -5.094.946 
sigma_u 10.854.528      
sigma_e .33902076      
rho .91111958 (fraction of variance  due to u_i)  
 
Here, the most significant coefficients are the (LMVE), (LEV) and (ESGSCORE) that 
positively impact on Audit Fees (LAUDIT), since there are greater than zero and the coefficient 
interval confirms that they don’t include a null number. Also, P-value which is lower than 0.05, 
agree with that results, emphasizes in the size of the firm (LMVE) and the CSR disclosure 
(ESGSCORE) as the most positive and significant parameters in determination of audit fees (p-
value=0.000). Moreover, p-value and z-score of (ROA) indicate a significant negative 
association with the (LAUDIT).  
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Table 20: PANEL DATA regression for three-top countries 
Random-effects GLS regression    Number of obs  = 536 
Group variable: FIRM     Number of groups = 141 
R-sq: within = 0.0297    Obs per group: min = 1 
Between  = 0.3788    avg   = 3.8 
Overall  = 0.3779     max   = 5 
Wald chi2(10) = 42.67 
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)      Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
(Std. Err. adjusted for 141 clusters in FIRM)  
 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z     P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
LMVE .2540524 .0494613 5.14    0.000 .1571101 .3509947 
LEV .7313475 .3808734 1.92    0.055 -.0151506 1.477.846 
ROA -.0025372 .0039725 -0.64    0.523 -.0103232 .0052488 
MTB2 -.0003804 .0006131 -0.62    0.535 -.001582 .0008212 
RINV -.0257459 .4169327 -0.06    0.951 -.8429191 .7914272 
WREVGR .0010816 .0015491 0.70    0.485 -.0019546 .0041178 
AGE .0104308 .0041839 2.49    0.013 .0022305 .018631 
ENDDUMMY -.1751875 .3470632 -0.50    0.614 -.8554189 .5050438 
NETINCDUM
MY 
-.0045037 .0522031 -0.09    0.931 -.1068198 .0978125 
ESGSCORE -.005772 .0042261 -1.37    0.172 -.014055 .002511 
_cons -4.949.666 1.100.628 -4.50    0.000 -7.106.856 -2.792476 
sigma_u 11.984.948      
sigma_e .26395465      
rho .95373891 (fraction 
of 
variance 
due 
to u_i)  
 
The statistically significant coefficients are the (LMVE) and the (AGE). Surprisingly, 
(ESGSCORE) does not seem to be an important predictor variable, since the p-value equals 
with 0.172 exceeding the level of 0.05 and zero is included in the 95% of coefficient interval. 
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Table 21: PANEL DATA regression full model 
Random-effects GLS regression    Number of obs  = 2049 
Group variable: FIRM      Number of groups = 571  
R-sq:  within  = 0.0186    Obs per group: min = 1  
between  = 0.4482      avg =3.6  
overall   = 0.444        max = 5  
Wald chi2(12)  = 188.18  
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)      Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
(Std. Err. adjusted for 571 clusters in FIRM)   
 
LAUDIT Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
z     P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
LMVE .2770591 .0274484 10.09    0.000 .2232613 .3308569 
LEV .5677341 .1923276 2.95    0.003 .190779 .9446892 
ROA -.0049783 .0022533 -2.21    0.027 -.0093947 -.0005619 
MTB2 -.0015512 .0012679 -1.22    0.221 -.0040363 .0009339 
RINV .1292147 .2384897 0.54    0.588 -.3382166 .5966459 
WREVGR .0009256 .0009513 0.97    0.331 -.0009389 .0027902 
AGE .0020863 .0019594 1.06    0.287 -.001754 .0059266 
ENDDUMMY .0863943 .1171608 0.74    0.461 -.1432367 .3160253 
NETINCDUM
MY 
-.0091058 .0350791 -0.26    0.795 -.0778596 .059648 
_IHigh_1 .9965752 .2002904 4.98    0.000 .6040133 1.389.137 
ESGSCORE .0109258 .0022833 4.79    0.000 .0064507 .0154009 
_IHigXESGSC
_1 
-.0146886 .0049247 -2.98    0.003 -.0243408 -.0050365 
cons -6.284.483 .6255289 -10.05    0.000 -7.510.497 -5.058.469 
sigma_u 11.497.09
1 
     
sigma_e .32043694      
rho .92791924 (fraction of 
variance 
due 
to u_i)  
 
As before, it can be clearly observed that the (LMVE), (LEV) and (ROA), note some 
significance impact on the audit pricing (LAUDIT), with p-values lower than 0.05. In addition, 
the (High1) variable and the (ESGSCORE) have positive influence on the output variable 
(LAUDIT), with p-values equals to 0.000. Interestingly, the most statistically significant 
variable in this model is the (High*ESG), with the z-score= -2.98 < 1.96, p-value= 0.003 < 0.05 
and the interval of the coefficient in 95% does not include any null number.  
 
 
